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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE MINIMUM WAGE
SEPTEMBER 2014
BEN ZIPPERER
B.S., UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ATHENS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Arindrajit Dube
This three-essay dissertation empirically examines the effects of minimum wages
on teen and restaurant earnings and employment, and also on the receipt of public
benefit programs. In the first chapter, co-authored with Arindrajit Dube, we extend
the synthetic control approach to 32 state-level case studies of minimum wage increases.
We do not find a statistically significant effect on teen employment, with the mean
elasticity close to zero. There is also no indication of heterogeneous treatment effects.
Finally, we discuss some important practical challenges, including the ability to find
close matches and the choice of predictors used for constructing a synthetic control.
The second chapter focuses on the heterogeneity of minimum wage effects across
low- and high-wage areas. In a border discontinuity study of county-level data on
restaurants, I find that in counties where the minimum wage binds more, restaurant
workers have statistically larger elasticities of earnings and also that there are sug-
gestions of larger disemployment effects. Importantly, I find relatively constant labor
demand elasticity estimates along a wide range of minimum-to-median wage ratios.
v
In counties with minimum-to-median wage ratios of 0.32 and 0.52, the labor demand
elasticity estimates range from a low of -0.242 to a high of -0.343. The narrow range
of labor demand elasticity point estimates suggests that increased employment re-
sponses are due simply to increased coverage of the minimum, as opposed to nonlinear
responses in labor demand.
In the third chapter, I estimate the effects of the minimum wage on participation
in several major public benefits programs. I find uniform evidence across specifications
that increases in the minimum wage strongly reduce participation in food stamps
programs: in my preferred specification, the elasticity of food stamps receipt with
respect to the minimum is -0.39, with a 95 percent confidence interval of (-0.57, -0.22).
Effects on school lunch subsidy and Medicaid participation range from near zero to
statistically significant elasticities of -0.11 and -0.16, respectively, depending on the
exact specification. I also estimate minimum wage effects close to zero for Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) participation.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
POOLED SYNTHETIC CONTROL ESTIMATES FOR
RECURRING TREATMENTS: AN APPLICATION TO
MINIMUM WAGE CASE STUDIES1
1.1 Chapter abstract
We apply the synthetic control approach in a setting with multiple cases and
recurring treatments. Using minimum wage changes as an application, we propose a
simple distribution-free method for pooling across cases using mean percentile ranks,
which have desirable small sample properties. We invert the mean rank statistic in
order to construct a confidence interval for the pooled estimate, and we test for the
heterogeneity of the treatment effect using the distribution of estimated ranks. We
also offer guidance on model selection and match quality—issues that are of practical
concern in the synthetic control approach generally and when pooling across many
cases. Using 32 cases of state minimum wage increases between 1979 and 2013, we do
not find a statistically significant effect on teen employment, with the mean elasticity
close to zero. There is also no indication of heterogeneous treatment effects. Finally,
we discuss some important practical challenges, including the ability to find close
matches and the choice of predictors used for constructing a synthetic control.
1.2 Introduction
The synthetic control offers a data driven method for choosing control groups that is
valuable for individual case studies (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller, 2010, hereafter
1This paper is co-authored with Arindrajit Dube.
1
ADH). This increasingly popular technique generalizes the difference-in-difference
approach and also provides a semi-parametric version of the lagged dependent variables
model, offering a way to control for time-varying heterogeneity that complicates
conventional regression analysis. For a single state that receives a policy treatment,
the synthetic control is the weighted average of untreated units that best predicts the
treated state in the pre-treatment period, and the estimator is the post-treatment
difference between the treated state and its synthetic control. Whereas conventional
regression designs equally weight all units (conditional on covariates), units comprising
the synthetic control typically receive unequal weights. Matching on pre-treatment
outcomes allows the synthetic control approach to provide unbiased estimates for case
studies even when there are multiple unobserved time factors, unlike the conventional
difference-in-difference model which imposes a single factor assumption.
A growing number of papers have used the synthetic control approach to study
topics as diverse as the impacts of anti-smoking legislation (ADH), immigration
laws (Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael 2013), and minimum wages (Sabia, Burkhauser
and Hansen 2012). However, to date the applications have largely been restricted
to estimating the effect of individual treated cases or to presenting numerous such
estimates separately. For example, Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) use synthetic
controls to investigate the effects of 30 country-level episodes of trade liberalization
on their GDP. While the authors helpfully organize their presentation of synthetic
and actual GDP trends by region and time period, the presentation of 30 individual
pictures obscures their argument that later episodes of liberalization failed to boost
GDP. Some episodes appear to raise, lower, or have no effect on growth, and it becomes
difficult for the reader to gauge the magnitude of estimates or to draw statistical
inference. Perhaps due to issues of space, for only 16 of the 30 case studies do the
authors display figures relating to statistical inference, perhaps due to issues of space.
Using synthetic controls, Campos et al. (2014) estimate a mean effect of EU integration
2
on GDP, but the authors do not perform statistical inference on either the mean or
individual case study estimates.
In this paper, we present a method for pooling synthetic control estimates in a
setting with recurring treatments with variable intensity: state-level minimum wage
changes. Because the intensity of the treatment varies across cases, we convert the
estimates to elasticities by scaling them by the sizes of the minimum wage changes
and then average these elasticities across events. A key contribution of the paper
shows how the mean of the percentile ranks of the effects in the treated states vis-à-vis
donor (or potential control) states can be used to judge the statistical significance
for a pooled estimate, the Hodges Jr. and Lehmann (1963) point estimate. Pooling
the estimates using their ranks is particularly useful since the exact distribution of
the sum (or mean) of the ranks under the null is known, enabling us to perform
exact inference that is valid for small samples. Additionally, we invert the mean rank
statistic to construct the confidence interval for the pooled estimate. Our approach
of pooling across treated units is closely related to the van Elteren (1960) stratified
rank sum test. It is also a natural extension of the placebo-based inference used by
ADH for a single case study, where the distribution of a test statistic under the null
is constructed by randomly permuting the treatment status of the donor units. Our
inferential procedure has some similarity to Conley and Taber (2011); operating under
the classic difference-in-difference context, they also use information from control
units to form an empirical distribution under the null, and invert the test statistic
to construct confidence intervals that are valid with a small number of treated cases.
Finally, Dube, Kaplan and Naidu (2011) also use a average rank-based test that is
valid for small samples in the context of financial market event studies.
Since percentile ranks of the estimates have a known distribution under the null
hypothesis, exact inference is feasible not only for the mean but also distributional
statistics as well. In this paper we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test whether
3
the distribution of ranked effects indicates heterogeneity in the effect of the treatments.
One concern when pooling across events is that the quality of match between the
treated and synthetic control unit may be poor in some instances. We assess the role
of match quality by trimming on pre-intervention goodness of fit as determined by the
mean squared prediction error (MSPE). A final contribution of the paper concerns the
choice of predictor variables, since there is little guidance on this issue in the existing
literature. We use a cross-validation criterion of minimizing MSPE among donor units
to choose between alternative sets of predictors.
The minimum wage offers an interesting setting for applying the synthetic control
estimator, since states receiving treatment have important differences that appear
to vary over time, thereby confounding the standard fixed effects panel estimator
(Allegretto, Dube, Reich and Zipperer, 2013a). Since the synthetic control method
depends on isolated treatment events with well-defined pre- and post-treatment periods,
the approach can only utilize a limited amount of minimum wage variation available
to conventional regression techniques. We select those events with no minimum wage
changes two years prior to treatment and with at least one year of post-treatment data,
which we consider to be the minimal requirement for measuring the policy’s impact.
Of the 215 state minimum wage changes during our 1979-2013 study period, only 32
meet our minimal criteria; on average these events have a 20 quarters of data prior to
the intervention and 9 quarters afterward. While this is a limited number of events,
we show that pooling across these 32 cases provides us with sufficient statistical power
to detect economically relevant effects posited in the literature.
Our results show that the minimum wage changes were binding: 27 out of the 32
cases have positive effects on average teen wage, with a median elasticity of 0.22 and
mean of 0.32. The pooled estimate is statistically significant at the one percent level
using our mean rank test. Turning to teen employment, we find 15 positive elasticities
and 17 negative ones. Both the median (-0.019) and mean (-0.039) estimates are
4
small in magnitude. The mean percentile rank is 0.497 and the associated pooled
Hodges-Lehman elasticity is -0.029. With a 5 percent confidence interval, we rule out
a pooled employment elasticity more negative than -0.153. We also show that the
distribution of the ranked employment estimates is consistent with the sharp null of
zero effect everywhere, as opposed to an averaging of true positive and true negative
effects across events. To address concerns about match quality, we show that our
results are similar after trimming our case studies to those with better pre-treatment
fit. We do note that the treated states are generally some of the highest wage areas,
making it difficult to find a convex combination of donors to closely match the average
wage level in the pre-intervention period. However, this does not affect our ability to
match their overall employment dynamics prior to the intervention.
Three papers in the minimum wage literature have particular relevance to the
application of synthetic controls. An early precursor to synthetic controls is the study
of California’s 1988 minimum wage change by Card (1992). Card compares California
with an aggregate control formed by four southern states and one metro area that
failed to raise their minimum wages during the 1987-1989 period. Similar to the
synthetic control approach, the aggregated control in Card (1992) roughly matches
California on several pre-treatment labor market and demographic characteristics.
However, Card’s selection of the donor states is heuristic and not based on a solution
to the explicit optimization problem underlying the contemporary synthetic control
approach.
More recently, Sabia et al. (2012) uses the synthetic control approach to study
the impact of the 2005 New York minimum wage increase. They ignore four other
candidate treatment events that also began the same year in Florida, Minnesota,
New Jersey, and Wisconsin. It is not clear what guided the authors’ selection of
New York as the sole case; in our results for these five states, we find that the New
York event is associated with the most negative employment estimate. Sabia et al.
5
(2012) also crucially fail to use any pre-treatment outcomes as predictors. Although
any characteristics unaffected by the policy treatment are valid predictors under the
synthetic control approach, some combination of pre-intervention outcomes should
be included. Intuitively, if the synthetic control fits a sufficiently large set of pre-
intervention outcomes, it is able to account for any number of time-varying factors.2
As a result of omitting pre-intervention outcomes, the authors obtain an invalid
synthetic control: specifically, employment paths for actual and synthetic New York
never coincide during the entire 2000-2004 pre-treatment period.3
Neumark, Wascher and Salas (2013) use a matched panel estimator loosely based
on the synthetic control method. They do not actually pool synthetic control estimates:
rather, they use weights calculated using synthetic control to create matches and then
estimate a panel regression with this sample. Allegretto et al. (2013a) discusses in
detail the serious problems with this approach. Most fundamentally, as the authors
acknowledge, there is no econometric basis for this estimator. For example, they use
residuals from an OLS regression of employment on the minimum wage as the predictor
for calculating synthetic control weights. However, these are not valid predictors
for a synthetic control study.4 Additionally, their donors are sometimes themselves
receiving treatment, violating a key assumption of the synthetic control approach.
They also use a very short pre-intervention window (4 quarters) to calculate synthetic
2Formally, the unbiasedness of the synthetic control estimator relies specifically on pre-treatment
outcome balance between the treated unit and the weighted combination of donors (see Appendix B
of ADH). The choice of exactly which pre-treatment outcomes and other characteristics to select as
predictor variables is not obvious, a priori. We provide guidance for these decisions in section 1.4.2.
3See Figure 3 of Sabia et al. (2012). Relatedly, the authors try to account for the poor pre-
intervention fit by using a difference-indifference with respect to the synthetic control. However, this
is quite different from the synthetic control estimator, which requires the pre-intervention values in
the treated and synthetic control units to be close.
4Besides being ad hoc, the use of OLS residuals as predictor variables does not have a heuristic
justification. In the best case scenario, if the OLS estimates are unbiased, then the true and estimated
residuals are uncorrelated with all covariates—making them uninformative as variables to construct
a reliable control group. In contrast, if the OLS estimates are biased, so are the estimated residuals,
making them potentially worse than uninformative.
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control matches, which makes finding a good match difficult. Finally, they use only a
single quarter of post-intervention data to measure the policy impact—making this
the shortest-run estimate in the minimum wage literature of which we are aware.
In contrast to these prior applications, we select 32 different events using clear (and
reasonable) criteria for case selection, estimate synthetic controls for each treatment
using a data-driven choice of predictors, and pool across these estimates using rigorous
statistical procedures that are valid for small samples.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the synthetic
control method and explains our proposed rank-based inference for the pooled estimate.
Section 3 discuss our sample and the choice of predictor variables. Section 4 presents
our findings, including the mean effect and the test of heterogeneity, as well as issues
of match quality. Section 5 concludes.
1.3 Synthetic controls and multiple case studies
1.3.1 Synthetic control estimators
Consider the case of a single treated state (i = 1) that raises its minimum wage
at time t = t′, where the outcome of interest Yit is teen employment. Denoting the
intervention as D, the synthetic control approach assumes a data generating process
such that the observed outcome Yit is a sum of the effect from the treatment, α1tDit,
and the counterfactual outcome, Y Nit :
Yit = αitDit + Y Nit = αitDit + θtZi + λtµi + δt + it.
Here δt is an unknown common factor with constant factor loadings across units, Zi
is a (1 × r) vector of observed covariates unaffected by the intervention, and θt is
a vector of unknown parameters. Like the standard fixed effects model, there is a
common time factor δt. However, there is an additional λtµi term as well. Here λt is
a vector of unobserved time-varying factors and µi are the unknown factor loadings.
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Since the factor loadings can vary across states, treatment and control states need not
follow parallel trends, conditional on observables. If we knew the true factor loadings
µ1 for the treated state, we could construct an unbiased control by taking untreated
“donor” states whose factor loadings average to µ1. Since we do not observe the factor
loadings, the synthetic control procedure constructs a vector of weights W over J
donor states such that the weighted combination of donor states closely matches the
treated state in pre-intervention outcomes. This weighted combination of donors is
called the synthetic control; as shown in ADH, the average factor loadings of the
synthetic control thus constructed matches the loadings of the treated state.
Formally, for the treated state, define the (k× 1) vector of pre-treatment character-
istics as X1 =
(
Z′1, Y K1i , . . . , Y KLi
)
, where k = r+L and Y Kli are L linear combinations
of pre-treatment outcomes. Analogously, define the k × J matrix X0 containing the
same characteristics for the J donor states. The synthetic control procedure chooses
donor weightsW to minimize the distance between pre-treatment characteristics X1
and X0 of the treated state and untreated states. The distance equals the mean square
prediction error (MSPE)
k∑
m=1
vm(X1m −X0mW)2
over k pre-treatment characteristics, and where vm measures relative importance of
the m-th predictor. Given the optimal weights w∗j for each of the j = 2, . . . , N donors,
the synthetic control at any time t is simply the weighted combination of donor
employment ∑Nj=2w∗jYjt. The estimate of the employment impact α1t is therefore
difference between employment in the treated state Y1t and the synthetic state
∑
j w
∗
jYjt
at any post-treatment time t > t′:
αˆ1t = Y1t −
N∑
j=2
w∗jYjt.
When the intensity of treatment varies across events, elasticities offer a simple
way of comparing across events. Moreover, the use of elasticities also connects our
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findings with other estimates in the minimum wage literature. For this reason, our key
estimates of interest are the employment or wage elasticities of the minimum wage,
defined as follows. For a single treatment event, we construct the synthetic control∑
j w
∗
jYjt for the treated outcome Y1t. In the post-intervention period t = t′, . . . , T ,
the average percent difference between the treated and synthetic control outcomes is
given by
βˆ1 =
1
T
∑T
t=t′
(
Y1t −∑j w∗jYjt)
1
T
∑T
t=t′
∑
j w
∗
jYjt
.
Writing the percent minimum wage increase as
∆MW = MWt
′ −MWt′−1
MWt′−1
we define the post-treatment elasticity η1 to be the ratio
ηˆ1 =
βˆ1
∆MW .
As we describe below, it will be useful for placebo-based inference to construct
analogous elasticities ηj for each of the donor states. Specifically, for each of the donor
states j = 2, . . . , N we calculate the post-treatment difference βj, this time using the
remaining N − 2 donor states as donors for the synthetic control of state j. The
placebo elasticity ηj is scaled by the actual minimum wage increase in treated state:
ηj = βj/∆MW .5
When there are multiple treatment events, we calculate separate event-specific
elasticities ηe1 = βej/∆MWe for the events e = 1, . . . , E. Note that this construction
of elasticities allows us to incorporate the fact that treated states vary both in their
outcome levels and in their minimum wage treatment intensities. To aggregate across
5As we discuss in Section 1.4, since some states change their minimum wage multiple times during
the post-treatment period, we simply define the minimum wage change to be the largest percent
change between the post- and pre-treatment periods. We define the elasticity η1 using the ratio of
means in β1 rather than the post-treatment mean of the percent changes 1T
∑T
t=t′
(
Y1t−
∑
j
w∗j Yjt∑
j
w∗
j
Yjt
)
to avoid the possibility that the resulting elasticity has a different sign than the post-treatment mean
of level changes in the numerator of β1.
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events we simply take the mean or median of these estimated elasticities. The mean
treatment effect, for example, is equal to the mean elasticity
η =
∑
e ηˆe1
E
.
1.3.2 Inference using the rank test with single and multiple events
We follow ADH in using placebo-based inference from randomly permuting the
treatment status in donor states in order to assess the statistical significance of a
single treated state’s estimated elasticity. For each event, we estimate ηej for every
donor state j (excluding the actually treated state but using the same minimum wage
change) and determine whether the elasticity ηe1 for the treated state lies in the tails
of the resulting placebo distribution formed by ηˆej for j = 2, . . . , Ne.
Equivalently, we summarize the relative position of the treated state’s elasticity
among the placebo distribution by using the percentile rank statistic pe1 = Fˆe(ηe1),
where Fˆe is the empirical CDF of the elasticities ηˆej from event e.6 Since the percentile
rank is (approximately) uniformly distributed on the unit interval, we determine
whether the rank of the treated state pe1 lies in the tails of the uniform distribution.
Using a statistical significance level of five percent, we reject the null of ηe1 = 0
precisely when pe1 < 0.025 or pe1 > 0.975. We note that the number of available
donors limits the range of confidence levels we can implement for a single treated
event. For example, many of our events have only twenty donors; in these cases we
can only assess a ten percent level of significance. Using multiple events allows us to
assess stronger levels of statistical confidence.
6To calculate the percentile pei of the ranked position rei of the estimated elasticity ηej for state
i in event e, we use the Weibull-Gumbel rule (see Hyndman and Fan, 1996): pe = re1/(Ne + 1),
where Ne equals one plus the number of donor states, ensuring that the median effect within an
event receives the rank 0.50 when the total number of states Ne is odd.
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The above approach suggests a natural way of conducting inference in a pooled
case study approach by constructing a test statistic p which is the the mean of the
percentile ranks of individual events:
p =
∑E
e=1 pe
E
.
The exact distribution of p can be calculated using the Irwin-Hall distribution of the
sum of E independent uniform random variables. The sum of the ranks, s = E · p,
has the the CDF
Γ(s;E) = 1
E!
bsc∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
E
k
)
(s− k)E−1
where b.c is the floor function.7 Under the sharp null hypothesis of zero effect
everywhere, the average of E ranks, p, is distributed with mean 0.5. If G(x;E) =
Γ(x ·E;E) denotes the CDF of the mean of E uniformly distributed variables random
variables, then for a statistical significance level of five percent, we reject the null
hypothesis η = 0 precisely when G(p;E) < 0.025 or G(p;E) > 0.975.
While the central limit theorem tells us that the distribution of the mean rank
will converge to an appropriately scaled normal distribution, for small E we should
prefer to use the exact distribution. Table 1.11 shows various percentiles of this
distribution for E = 1, . . . , 35. At 32 treatment events—the maximum number of
case studies we will have in our study—a two-sided 5% significance test requires the
mean rank to fall below 0.400 or above 0.600. We note that this method is closely
related to the van Elteren (1960) stratified rank sum test, where the rank of each
treatment is estimated using placebos associated with the stratum (i.e., event). The
only substantive difference is that we use the percentile ranks of each treatment
from each stratum, pe1, instead of the ranked position re1, for transparency of the
7See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irwin-Hall_distribution.
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calculations; this choice potentially impacts the critical values when the number of
observations (states) varies across strata (events) and the number of observations
is also small. However, in practice, there is very little difference if we calculate the
critical values taking into account the number of observations in each stratum used to
calculate the ranks.8 For concision, in the rest of this paper we will often we refer to
the percentile rank as simply the “rank.”
While there are alternative ways of doing pooled inference, we note some advantages
to our approach. First, the rank-based pooling is a natural generalization of the single-
case study based inference in ADH, who use the rank of the treatment effect for
individual events. Second, the mean (or sum of) ranks has a known distribution under
the sharp null, allowing for exact inference. This avoids reliance on large sample
properties, and also avoids the empirical estimation of distribution of the statistic
under the null—as would be the case were we, for example, to conduct inference for
the mean elasticity. Third, and relatedly, the use of the mean rank p diminishes the
impact of outliers as compared to the mean elasticity η, which may be a particular
concern given a small number of events. Fourth, within the class of rank sum tests,
the ranks could be estimated without regard to strata, as in the case of the Wilcoxon
(1945) rank sum test. However, stratification accounts for event-wise heteroscedasticity,
which may be of particular concern given varying window lengths across events. One
limitation of our approach is that we are testing the sharp null that effect is zero
everywhere, as opposed to the average effect being zero. However, we address this
concern in Section 1.5.3 by testing for heterogeneous treatment effects.
8Simulations of the mean of 32 percentile ranks calculated by the Weibull rule (with the appropriate
number of donors for each event) result in 95% critical values 0.403 and 0.597, in contrast to 0.400
and 0.600 from the mean of 32 continuous uniforms. The associated rejection rate using the Weibull-
rule-based distribution with continuous uniform critical values is 4.3 percent instead of 5.0 percent.
See the Appendix for details.
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1.3.3 Inverting the rank test to form confidence intervals
We also invert the individual-event and mean rank statistic to estimate confidence
sets.9 These confidence sets show values of the elasticities which imposed as the null
cannot be rejected as being equal to the estimated effect. For a single treatment
event with estimated elasticity ηˆe1, we use the percentile rank pe1 = Fˆe(ηˆe1) as the
test statistic to determine statistical significance: we cannot reject the null hypothesis
ηe1 = 0 at the five percent level precisely when 0.025 ≤ Fˆe(ηe1) ≤ 0.975. Inverting
this test, we ask for what values of τ does the adjusted response ηe1 − τ appear free
from treatment: when does 0.025 ≤ Fˆe(ηˆe1 − τ) ≤ 0.975? The 95 percent confidence
interval is the set of τ not rejected using the critical values 0.025 and 0.0975.
In the framework of multiple treatment events, we can apply a similar procedure
to construct Hodges Jr. and Lehmann (1963) confidence intervals for the pooled effect,
using the mean rank p as the test statistic to be inverted. We first calculate the
adjusted responses ηe1 − τ for all events e = 1, ..., E, and re-calculate event-specific
ranks Fˆe(ηˆe1 − τ). Define the mean adjusted rank
p(τ) =
∑
e Fˆe(ηe1 − τ)
E
.
The 95 percent confidence interval for the pooled effect is the set of τ such the mean
adjusted rank p(τ) lies within the critical values given by the mean of E uniform
distributions. In other words, we find values τ such that 0.025 < G(p(τ);E) <
0.975. Figure 1.1 illustrates this procedure for the estimated mean elasticity η = c.
The confidence interval is (c − b, c + a) because G(p(c − (c + a));E) = 0.05 and
G(p(c− (c− b));E) = 0.95.
Collapsing these confidence intervals yields the Hodges-Lehman point estimate,
which we also refer to as the pooled estimate. In the case of a single event, the
9Although ADH do not explicitly construct these confidence sets in the case of their single
treatment event, they follow directly from their inferential procedure.
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mean, median, and pooled effects are trivially the same, and so are the confidence
intervals. In the case of multiple events, the mean, median and Hodges-Lehman point
estimate and confidence intervals need not correspond. This is especially the case
when outlying estimates of individual treatment events heavily influence the mean
estimate. The robustness to outliers is one reason we prefer using the Hodges-Lehman
confidence interval, as it is ultimately based on ranked location. Our primary estimates
report the mean percentile rank, the pooled Hodges-Lehman point estimate, and the
Hodges-Lehmann confidence intervals. We also report the median and mean elasticities
because of their natural interpretations.
Our inference assumes that the ranks of the treated states across events are
independent draws. There are two potential concerns with this assumption, but overall
we do not believe they represent major problems in our case. First, some events are
from the same state, which may bring up a concern that the ranks of the events are
not independent draws. However, while Yit may be serially correlated, the same need
not be true for ηˆeit across two events e′ and e′′ from the same state i in time periods
t′ and t′′. If the synthetic control estimator is unbiased, and it successfully matches
pre-treatment outcomes of both events, the post-treatment gap would from the two
events are (by construction) uncorrelated: E(ηˆe′1, ηˆe′′1) = 0.
The second and more serious concern is that the because the minimum wage
increases often occur around the same time, two states with minimum wage increases
may share many of the same potential donors. As a result, the ranks determined
by the placebo distributions are not truly independent across treatment events. For
two events e′ and e′′, the set of placebo estimates ηˆe′qt′ and ηˆe′qt′′ from donor q may
be correlated, in particular when t′ = t′′. In the extreme case, the donors and hence
the placebo estimates αˆe′qt′ may be identical. This induces a correlation in the ranks
Fˆe′(ηˆe′1) and Fˆe′′(ηˆe′′1) even though E(ηˆe′1, ηˆe′′1) = 0 . However, in reality the overlap
in donor pool is only partial, which mitigates this problem. As a way to bound the
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bias in our inference, we calculate critical values using placebo-law interventions that
match the timing and donor overlap patterns of the actual 32 treatments in our sample.
The results suggest that donor overlap has no substantial impact on critical values,
justifying our use of the mean of independent uniform distributions.10
1.4 Minimum wage treatment events and empirical specifi-
cation
1.4.1 Sample periods and timing of treatment
The synthetic control estimator requires a set of untreated or donor units for
each treatment event. Since the vast majority of states were affected by the federal
minimum wage increases, federal increases are not suitable for use with the synthetic
control method: there are very few untreated donors that can be drawn from to
construct a synthetic control for affected states. For example, 45 states changed their
minimum wage at some point during the year of the 2007 federal minimum wage
increase, leaving only 5 states as potential donors to form synthetic controls.
To maximize the number of treatment events, we consider the entire 1979-2013
period available using Current Population Survey (CPS) data. We focus on teen
employment and wages, as many 16- to 19-year olds have wages near the minimum.
During this period, almost 38 percent of teens received wages within 10% of the
statutory minimum wage, compared with about 5% of workers aged 20 to 64. While
there is considerable debate regarding the size of teen employment effects, we expect to
find significantly positive effects on teen wages. The high incidence of minimum wage
workers among teens makes them the most frequently studied group in the minimum
10A Monte Carlo simulation of placebo-law interventions obtains 95% critical values for the mean
percentile rank of 32 events of 0.392 and 0.607, in contrast to 0.400 and 0.600 using the mean of
32 independent uniform random variables. Using the latter critical values with the placebo-law
simulation distribution implies a rejection rate of 6.9 percent instead of 5.0 percent. See Appendix
for details.
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wage literature (e.g., Neumark et al. 2013, Allegretto et al. 2013a). For outcome
variables we calculate quarterly state-level teen employment-to-population ratios and
average wages using the CPS.11 Although annual state means would contain less noise,
they would correspondingly limit the number of pre- and post-treatment observations;
moreover, not all minimum wage increases occur during the same part of the calendar
year.
The top panel of Figure 1.2 shows all quarterly minimum wage changes during
the study period.12 During this period the federal minimum wage increased nine
times, indicated by the vertical lines in the Figure. Aside from federal minimum wage
changes, 33 states in this period raised their minimum wage 215 times. Many states
increase their minimum wage frequently, often on an annual basis. To utilize the
synthetic control method, we limit the sample of usable treatment events to those
with well-defined pre- and post-treatment periods. We select those events with no
minimum wage changes two years prior to treatment and with at least one year of
post-treatment data. We also limit the sample to minimum wage increases of at least
5 percent, and to treatment events with at least 10 potential donors or untreated
states. These restrictions yield the 32 treatment events in the top panel of Figure 1.2
labeled in dark text.
The eligible events have valid pre- and post-treatment periods of varying length.
West Virginia, for example, has many years of data prior to its minimum wage change
in 2006q3 available but only one year of post-treatment data. By contrast, California’s
treatment in 2001q1 allows only two years of clean pre-treatment data but many
11For employment outcomes we use the Unicon CPS extracts for the monthly Basic Survey
(http://unicon.com). Wage data is only available in the outgoing rotation group subset of these
data; for wage data, we use the NBER Merged Outgoing Rotation Group extracts (http://www.nber.
org/morg/annual/). We calculate wages as hourly earnings or, if these are not reported, weekly
earnings divided by usual weekly hours. State-quarter-level averages use the sampling weights.
12We thank Sylvia Allegretto for providing monthly historical minimum data, which we convert
to quarterly averages.
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years of post-treatment data. Also, California’s post-treatment period includes an
additional minimum wage increase in 2002q1. To simplify choices, for each event we
select its “maximal” pre-treatment period available from 8-32 quarters; having done
so, we then select each event’s maximal post-treatment window from 4-12 quarters.
The bottom panel of Figure 1.2 illustrates these pre- and post-treatment selections
in blue and red, respectively, with circles indicating the times of treatment. Two
features stand out. First, while the pre-treatment period contains no minimum wage
increases by definition, the post-treatment period includes multiple minimum wage
changes—states that raise their minimum wage often do so again within the next year
or two. Table 1.1, which lists all 32 treatment event configurations that form the basis
for our primary specifications, shows that most events include multiple minimum wage
increases. There are four events whose post-treatment period includes four minimum
wage increases. For this reason our treatment intensity definition incorporates the
maximum minimum wage in the post-treatment period.
Second, Figure 1.2 there are three states in the 2000s with recurring minimum
wage changes where the post-treatment period of one minimum wage change overlaps
with the pre-treatment period of a later minimum wage change: Hawaii, Rhode Island,
and Vermont. For example, Hawaii’s post-treatment period for its 2002q1 treatment
overlaps with the pre-treatment period of Hawaii’s 2006q1 treatment. Delayed effects
from the former 2002q1 treatment could in principle violate the assumption that, for
the latter 2006q1 event, Hawaii’s pre-treatment period is absent from treatment. On
the other hand, the pre-treatment period of Hawaii’s 2006q1 is absent from treatment
using our original definition that it contains no minimum wage changes. For our
primary specifications we will include all 32 events, but we will also describe results
excluding the three events of Hawaii 2006q1, Rhode Island 2006q1, and Vermont
2004q1.
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There is a trade-off between window length and the number of events and donors.
Allowing relatively short pre- and post-treatment periods maximizes the number of
treatment events but, at the same time, may reduce the quality of the estimated
counterfactual, as there is less pre-treatment data informing the selection of synthetic
controls. On the other hand, lengthy pre-treatment periods limit both the number of
events and potential donors, thereby reducing the credibility the resulting estimates.
When we limit our treatment events to those with more restrictive pre- and post-
treatment window lengths, we sharply reduce the number of case studies, as Table
1.2 illustrates. The first line in Table 1.2 is our primary configuration: 32 events
with at least 8 and 4 quarters of respective pre- and post-treatment data. Requiring
pre-treatment and post-treatment windows of at least 16 and 8 quarters, respectively,
curtails the number of case studies to 17. In terms of restricting the donor availability,
the configurations in Table 1.2 show only a small amount of variation. As we limit the
pool of case studies to the most restrictive window configurations, the mean minimum
wage treatment rises a small amount, from about a 19 percent increase to an increase
of about 23 percent. Our primary results use the maximal window configuration with
32 events, but we explore how the alternate window configurations affect our results
in Section 1.5.3.
1.4.2 Specifying predictor variables
Any characteristics unaffected by the policy intervention are valid predictors under
the synthetic control approach, including demographic and industrial compositions or
other economic attributes of the region. However, the unbiasedness of the estimator
relies on the predictors including some linear combination of the pre-treatment values
of the outcome of interest. There are two related questions when it comes to these
predictors. First, exactly which variables should one include in the set of predictors?
Second, what weight should one place on each of those predictor variables when
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estimating the donor weights? ADH provides a simple answer to the second question
of how best to determine the weights on specific predictors within a set, which we
describe first. Then we tackle the more challenging question of what predictors—and
specifically what pre-treatment outcomes—one should include in this set.
For a given event e, the optimal donor weights are defined as
W∗e(Ve) = argmin
We
k∑
m
vm (Xe1m −Xe0mWe)2 . (1.1)
The optimal weights depend on the predictor importance matrix Ve = {vem} selected
by the researcher. For example, V might weight each predictor equally. Instead we
follow the suggestion in ADH to select V∗e such that the resulting synthetic control
best fits pre-treatment outcomes. We therefore solve the joint (nested) optimization
problem given by equation 1.1 and the equation
V∗e = argmin
Ve
∑
t<t′e
(Ye1t − Ye0tW(Ve))2
which minimizes pre-treatment fit. Our results use the “optimal” choice of weights
W∗e(V∗e) instead of alternatives such as manually specifying weights for predictors, or
using the computationally less intensive methods available to users.13
But exactly which sets of pre-treatment outcomes and other characteristics should
the researcher choose as predictors? When computationally feasible, perhaps the
simplest strategy is to include every pre-treatment outcome in the predictor set X. In
their study of the effects of Arizona’s 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act, Bohn et al.
(2013) employ this strategy with annual CPS data, using every pre-treatment value
13We implement the synthetic control approach in Stata using the synth package with nested opti-
mization and allopt starting point checks for robustness: http://www.mit.edu/~jhainm/synthpage.
html. There is a option for using a less computationally intensive but less reliable “regression-based”
predictor weights. In our experience, the regression-based weights can produce worse fit, and the
nested optimization uses regression-based weights as an initial set of values for optimization. The
optimization process always converges to a solution for the 32 actual treatments, but it fails to
converge for a small subset of donor-based placebo treatments – in only these cases do we resort to
the regression-based predictor weights. Failure to converge on an employment solution occurs 0.01,
0.06, 0.05, and 0.01 percent of the time for synthetic control models 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. For
wages, these failure rates are 1.73, 0.01, zero, and 1.53 percent.
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of the 1998-2006 non-citizen Hispanic share of the population, in addition to other
industrial and demographic shares.
Within the pre-intervention sample, one cannot do any better in terms of pre-
intervention MSPE than to include every pre-intervention outcome. However, this will
not be true when predicting out of the pre-intervention sample, which is ultimately the
object of interest. Matching on higher frequency pre-intervention data may actually
produce less reliable synthetic controls. For example, our study uses quarterly CPS
data, we risk matching on noise when using as predictors every quarterly pre-treatment
value of teen employment-to-population ratios or average wages. As a result, we also
consider the predictor set X consisting of annualized averages of the pre-treatment
outcome.14
Different sets of predictors may result in different synthetic controls, and there is
little explicit guidance in the synthetic control literature to assess predictor choice.
We consider four different predictor sets X, which vary according to whether we
include every quarterly or annualized pre-treatment outcome, and whether we include
other pre-treatment average demographic, labor market, industry shares.15 These
predictor sets are summarized at the bottom of Table 1.3. Using teen employment
as an example outcome, predictor set 1 is all quarterly pre-treatment values of
teen employment-to-population ratios. Predictor set 2 is all annualized pre-treatment
employment-to-population ratios. Predictor set 3 includes all annualized pre-treatment
employment and wage outcomes. Predictor set 4 adds to predictor set 3 the pre-
14Here, annualized averages refer to the mean of the first through fourth quarter before treatment,
the mean of the fifth through the eighth quarter before treatment, etc. For Minnesota’s 2005q3
treatment, say, these refer to the 2004q3-2005q2 mean, the 2003q3-2004q2 mean, etc.
15The demographic and labor market variables are the pre-treatment means of white, black,
female, and married shares of the teen population, the teen population share, the share of the overall
population with a college degree, and the overall unemployment rate. Industry variables are the
employment shares in agriculture & mining, construction, manufacturing, wholesale & retail trade,
transportation & utilities, information/finance/professional/business services, education & health
services, leisure/hospitality/personal services, and public administration.
20
treatment demographic, labor market, and industry shares described above. We note
that when every quarterly pre-intervention outcome is included in the predictor set,
inclusion of other predictor variables is redundant when weights on those predictors are
calculated optimally using nested optimization. For this reason, it only makes sense
to include variables such as industry or demographic shares when using annualized
and not quarterly pre-treatment outcomes.
To identify the “best” choice for X, we use a cross-validation procedure to choose
from different sets of predictors. Recall that in creating synthetic controls for each
event, the pre-intervention observations of donors effectively form a “training sample”
upon which we select synthetic control donor weights as well as predictor weights for a
given set of predictors. Here, when choosing the most reliable set of predictors, we use
the post-intervention observations of the donors as our “validation” sample to evaluate
prediction error associated with a given set of predictors. For a given predictor set
X, we calculate the post-treatment mean-squared prediction error (MSPE) for each
donor j given by
MSPEej =
1
Te
Te∑
t=t′e
(
Yjte −
∑
q
w∗eqYeqt
)2
where t′e begins the post-treatment period in event e, and where q indexes the available
N − 2 donors for (untreated) state j. We define the average RMSPE to be the square
root of the mean of this quantity across all donors for all 19 events. The optimal
model will yield the smallest post-treatment RMSPE, so predictor sets X with higher
average RMSPE in the post-treatment period indicate models with worse performance
in the sample of untreated donors.16
Table 1.3 reports the average donor RMSPE in the training sample for both the
post-treatment and pre-treatment periods across four candidate specifications for
16We do not use the treated states for this cross-validation exercise because use of the post-
treatment period in these states would require us to also have a valid estimate of the treatment
effect.
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predictors. Predictor set 1, which uses quarterly pre-treatment outcomes, naturally
obtains the best pre-treatment fit to quarterly employment or wages when compared to
predictor sets 2 through 4, which try to fit quarterly frequency data using annualized
pre-treatment outcomes. Incorporating both annualized outcomes and additional
controls improves pre-treatment fit relative to using only one annualized outcome: for
employment, pre-treatment RMSPE falls from about 0.040 in specification 2 to about
0.035 in specifications 3 and 4.
While using every pre-treatment outcome by definition maximizes goodness-of-fit
in the pre-intervention sample, the same need not hold out of sample. In terms of
post-treatment fit, the specification 4 is actually mildly preferable to specification
1. Using both annualized outcomes and demographic, labor market, and industry
shares in specification 4, the post-treatment RMSPE for teen employment is about
0.0472, compared to the RMSPE of about 0.0478 for quarterly predictors. For wages,
post-treatment RMSPE falls more—from 0.7911, when using quarterly outcomes in
specification 1, to about 0.7758 in specification 4. The observed reduction in RMSPE
—although admittedly small—is consistent with our a priori concerns about noise in
the aggregations of quarterly CPS data, leading us to select specification 4 as our
primary configuration. Yet because the small measured reduction in RMSPE makes
our preference for this model somewhat weak, we explore the robustness of estimates
across all sets of predictors in section 1.5.3.
1.5 Synthetic control estimates of minimum wage effects
1.5.1 Donors selected by synthetic control
Conditional on other covariates, conventional regression effectively assigns equal
weights to the states the researcher selects as potential controls. By contrast, the
synthetic control approach selects a convex combination of donor states based on that
combination’s pre-intervention fit to the treated state. For our sample of treatment
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events, we observe that the synthetic control procedure on average assigns greater
weights for nearby donors, suggesting that nearby states generally form better coun-
terfactuals than do distant states. To illustrate this, Table 1.4 compares average
per donor weights for those donors near to and further away from the treated state.
For each treated state, some donors reside within the same Census region as the
treatment, whereas other donors lie outside that region. We first calculate the sum,
across events, of all weights for these within-region donors, and then we divide this
sum by the total number of within-region donors. The first entry in Table 1.4 is
the resulting within-region per donor weight, 0.050, when the outcome of interest is
the teen employment-to-population ratio. For outside-region donors, the per donor
weight is 0.027. Calculating per donor weights in this way adjusts for the fact that the
number of potential donors within or outside a given area varies across treatments.
The primary statistic of interest in Table 5 is the ratio of within-area to outside-area
per donor weights: the relative per donor weight. For the employment-to-population
ratio, the relative weight is 1.836, indicating that donors within the same Census region
as the treated state are, on average, assigned weights almost twice as high as donors
from outside the the same Census region. Relative weights tend to increase as we
restrict the relative distance band. Same-Census-division donors – a finer aggregation
level – receive even more weight, with relative weights of about 3.0 and 2.5, for teen
employment and wages, respectively.17 Donors within 1000 miles receive 1.3 to 1.5
times as much weight, and donors within 500 miles receive about 2.0 times as much
weight. On the whole, the evidence shows that nearby donors form better synthetic
controls.
17The US Census Bureau partitions the country into four Census regions and nine Census divisions:
https://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf.
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1.5.2 Primary results
We begin with reporting the estimates for each of the 32 treatment events in Table
1.5. First, the results appear to indicate a positive impact of minimum wage increases
on average teen wages. While the wage elasticity estimates range from -0.188 to 1.337,
we find that 27 out of the 32 estimates are positive and almost half (15) are strictly
greater than 0.25. As described earlier, the reported rank is the percentile rank of the
treated state’s elasticity relative to the placebo distribution. Six of the 32 estimated
wage effects are statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Turning to teen employment, the estimated elasticities range from -1.999 to 0.829,
although 14 of the 32 events have employment effects less than 0.2 in magnitude.
Consistent with a constant zero treatment effect, or heterogeneous effects centered
around zero, 15 out of the 32 employment estimates are positive. There are two
statistically significant employment effects: both Massachusetts (-0.456) and Oregon (-
1.081) have negative elasticities that are significant at the 10 percent level. Highlighting
the imprecision of individual case studies, we find that the confidence intervals are
wide, with an average spread of X (Y) for employment (wage) elasticities.
The presence of occasionally very large estimates is partly due to the non-normality
of the distribution of synthetic control estimates. To show this, Figure 1.5 compares
probability densities of the donor employment and wage elasticities to normal proba-
bility densities. For both employment and wage outcomes, the placebo distribution
formed by the donors is clearly non-normal: although centered relatively close to zero
(about -0.01 and 0.01 in employment and wages, respectively), extreme values give the
placebo distribution fatter tails. The estimated kurtosis is 5.82 for donor employment
elasticities and 58.37 for wage elasticities, compared to the value of 3.0 for any normally
distributed sample. The especially severe departure from normality in wage estimates
is partly due to extreme estimates in this space with poor pre-intervention fit, as
discussed in Section 1.5.3. Shapiro-Wilk tests clearly reject the null of normality
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in both cases, with p-values close to zero. In the presence of such fatter tails, the
placebo-based confidence intervals are wider than those formed under large sample
assumptions.
The imprecision of individual estimates highlights the gains from pooling case
studies. Table 1.6 presents our preferred aggregated results as both the mean elasticity
and median elasticity across events. As discussed earlier, we also present the mean
ranks, and the associated Hodges-Lehmann confidence intervals; both the median
estimate and the Hodges-Lehman interval are less swayed by potential outliers, a
concern that is highlighted by the presence of fatter tails. The median and mean
employment elasticities for the 32 treatment events are relatively small: -0.019 and
-0.039, respectively. Across treatment events, the mean employment rank is 0.497,
essentially what would be expected under the null of a zero treatment effect. The
pooled Hodges-Lehman effect is small at -0.003 and statistically insignificant, as the
mean rank falls between the cutoffs (0.400, 0.600) derived from the 2.5th and 97.5th
percentiles of the mean of 32 uniformly distributed variables. The associated 95
percent confidence interval is (-0.153, 0.104). Although somewhat wide, pooling across
the 32 events nonetheless allows us to draw economically meaningful inference, and
rules out a substantial portion of the old “consensus” estimate of -0.1 to -0.3. (Brown
1999).
These small-to-zero aggregated employment effects contrast sharply with those for
wages, where the median and mean elasticity are 0.220 and 0.317, respectively. The
pooled wage elasticity of 0.265 is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, as the
mean rank is 0.763. The associated confidence interval rules out wage effects smaller
than 0.174 and larger than 0.382.
Figure 1.3 illustrates these aggregate effects by showing the time path of the mean
annualized employment and wage elasticities, both before and after the minimum
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wage increase.18 The top panel shows the mean annualized employment elasticities
ranging from 8 years prior to the minimum wage increase (i.e., quarters -32 through
-29) to 3 years afterward (i.e., quarters 8 through 11). The middle panel shows the
analogous estimates for wages. The bottom panel shows the number of treated states
used for the estimation of the elasticity of each 4-quarter bin, as well as the associated
proportionate change in the minimum wage.
For employment, all pre-treatment point estimates but the 8th year lead (i.e.,
quarters -32 through -29) are small in magnitude, adding validity to our research
design. After the minimum wage increase, employment nominally falls, but the
elasticity remains less than 0.1 in magnitude. For wages, pre-treatment elasticities
are centered around zero until about the first two years prior to treatment (quarters
-8 through -5), at which point we detect a statistically significant elasticity of about
0.1 on employment. Positive pre-treatment elasticities for wages suggest that the
synthetic control research design may not be as reliable for wage impacts – partly
because wages for minimum wage increasing states are generally higher than potential
donor states, making good matches difficult. At the same time we do find a sharp
increase in teen wages at the time of and after the minimum wage increase. The
Hodges-Lehmann point estimate for the teen wage elasticity lies between 0.2 and 0.4
in the post-treatment period. Approaching 0.40, the pooled wage elasticity is high
after three years of treatment, but this is not inconsistent with the fact that nearly 38
percent of teens during the 1979-2013 period earned within 10 percent of the minimum
wage.
18Specifically, we annualize actual treated state and synthetic control outcomes by taking the
event-specific mean of these values at every pre- and post-treatment four-quarter interval. The
percent difference between these values, divided by the actual minimum wage increase, forms the
event-specific elasticity at each time interval. The figure displays the mean elasticity across events
at each time interval. Performing the analogous calculation for the donors, we then construct
event-time-specific percentile ranks, which we invert to calculate Hodges-Lehmann point estimates
and 95% confidence intervals, where the latter use mean uniform cutoffs from Appendix Table 1.11
with the appropriate number events.
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Before exploring match quality and robustness issues, we take stock of our baseline
estimates in Figure 1.4. The Figure shows all 32 individual employment elasticities
(vertical axis) and wage elasticities, along with the mean and pooled effects. Overall,
while the estimates appear noisy, there is very little relation between the magnitude
of the wage elasticity and employment elasticity. In particular, the dotted line shows
the locus of unitary elasticity labor demand (ηemp/ηwage = −1), where wage impacts
of the minimum are completely offset by employment effects, ignoring any changes
in hours. Of the 32 treatment events, 21 lie clearly above this locus, as do the mean
and pooled effects. Discounting issues of statistical precision, the point estimates in
the Figure seem inconsistent with the idea that negative employment effects are more
likely when there is a more binding minimum wage: only when wage elasticities fall
below the pooled estimate of 0.265 do we observe events with employment elasticities
below the elastic demand locus.
1.5.3 Accounting for match quality
Pre-treatment fit to actually treated state is the key criterion for the credibility
of a synthetic control analysis. The extent to which a synthetic control matches
the treatment unit in the pre-treatment period indicates how well it accounts for
time-varying confounders. For a single case study, the pre-treatment match quality is
usually apparent: for example, the synthetic control for New York in in Sabia et al.
(2012) never coincides with the actual treated state. However, when pooling across
many cases, it may be difficult to evaluate and account for match quality merely by
inspection. Some of the the synthetic controls for the 32 treatment events in this
paper also suffer from poor pre-treatment fit, but our pooling of estimates does not
account for differences in match quality.
To assess this issue more systematically, we progressively exclude events with
particularly poor pre-treatment fit and examine how this affects our post-treatment
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elasticities. For each treatment event, we calculate a pre-treatment RMSPE between
the synthetic and actual treatment outcomes—this is our measure of pre-treatment fit.
We also calculate an estimated pre-treatment elasticity, defined just as our conventional
treatment effect η1 except calculated over the pre-treatment period (and scaled by
the actual minimum wage increase). Next, we trim our sample of case studies on
pre-treatment fit and examine how the trimming affects the pooled pre-treatment and
post-treatment elasticities.19
Figure 1.7 shows how pre- and post-treatment elasticities vary after trimming up
to 11 events (about one-third of our sample). The top panel shows that the post-
treatment Hodges-Lehmann point estimate remains relatively for both employment
and wages. One exception is the mean wage effect, which rises from to just below 0.40
after removing 11 events with the worst match quality. We discuss how the mean wage
effect is susceptible to three large elasticities (greater than 1.0) in the next section. In
the bottom panel, pre-treatment elasticites for employment remain close to zero. For
wages, as we eliminate events with the worst match quality, pre-treatment elasticities
fall only slightly. The pooled pre-treatment wage elasticity is always statistically
significant at the 5 percent level, indicating that our research design spuriously detects
some pre-trends in wages. These spurious effects are nonetheless very small, always
less than 0.05.
While the foregoing trimming of treatment events aims to improve the identification
of the pooled treatment effect, there is also a concern that poor match quality for
donor-based (placebo) synthetic controls biases our inference. In particular, donors
whose synethetic controls have poor pre-treatment fit are not informative for assessing
the post-treatment rank of the treated state. In the context of a single treatment
19Note that a reduction in the pre-treatment RMSPE can occur either from a reduced pre-
treatment variance or a pre treatment bias. Therefore, an improved pre-treatment fit does not
automatically guarantee a smaller pre-treatment elasticity, which is the measure of bias.
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event, ADH address this concern by limiting inference to the subset of donors with
better pre-treatment synthetic control fit relative to the treated state. Specifically,
using the ratio γj = MSPEj/MSPE1 of donor-to-treated synthetic control fit during
the pre-treatment period, ADH limit randomization inference to subsets of donors
with lower values of this ratio. Following this guidance, we explore how mean ranks
and the associated confidence intervals change when we limit donors to those with
event specific ratios γej = MSPEej/MSPEe1 less than 20, 10, 5, and 2.
Table 1.7 presents the pooled effects from this exercise. Restricting donors has
almost no effect on the mean rank or Hodges-Lehmann confidence intervals for the
pooled employment elasticity, even when we limit the number of donors to those with
MSPE ratios of less than 2, removing nearly one-quarter of donor states from the
full sample. For wages, removing donors with the worst relative pre-treatment fit has
removes some extreme donor elasticities: moving from the full sample to the subset of
donors with a MSPE ratio of less than 20, the maximum donor of elasticity of 8.170
and kurtosis of 58.4 fall to 3.439 and 12.0, respectively. But as with employment,
inference for wages remains relatively unchanged.
1.5.4 Robustness to window configuration length and predictor sets
Researchers using synthetic controls face choices about the exact length of pre-
and post-treatment windows: more lengthy pre-treatment windows provide more
pre-treatment predictor information but also reduce the number of available treatment
events. Similarly, synthetic control-based research designs require decisions about the
exact set of predictor variables. In this section, we consider how the aggregated results
change when modifying window configuration length and the predictor variable set.
We explore two issues using alternative configuration lengths: first, what happens
to our estimates when we allow for longer lagged effects? Second, we examine how
our estimates vary when we only consider events with a longer pre-intervention period
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to fit the model. To consider lagged effects, Table 1.8 begins by showing employment
effect estimates for the subsets of events with longer post-treatment periods. When we
restrict the sample to those with at least 3 years of post-treatment data (12 quarters),
the mean and Hodges-Lehmann point estimates stay very close zero. Only in the case
of restricting the sample to post-treatment periods of at least 10 quarters, where the
mean employment elasticity is -0.06, are we unable to reject a pooled elasticity greater
than -0.20 in magnitude. In short, although we cannot reject moderately sized lagged
effects of, say, -0.10, we are unable to detect any presence of lagged effects through the
third year of treatment. Table 1.8 also shows that our employment effect estimates
are similar for events with longer pre-intervention periods. After requiring events to
have longer pre-intervention windows, pooled employment elasticities remain small
and range from -0.003 to 0.072.
Table 1.8 reports suggestive evidence of lagged wage effects, as the pooled elasticity
rises monotonically from 0.265, to 0.303, and then to 0.392, moving from the full sample
to events to those with two and then three years of post-treatment data, respectively.
Mean elasticities for these subsets seem rather high, ranging from 0.317 to 0.505,
and sometimes come close to the upper bound of the Hodges-Lehmann confidence
intervals. These large elasticities are substantially influenced by three events with
wage elasticities greater than 1.0 (MA 1986q3, ME 1985q1, NH 1987q1). As we require
samples with longer pre-intervention windows, the mean and pooled wage elasticity
estimates rise to 0.379 and 0.289, respectively, but then begin fall sharply to about
0.250 and 0.188 and below when requiring at least six years of treatment. These
requirements drop the aforementioned extreme elasticites and mechanically lower our
pooled estimates. While the magnitude of the wage effect shifts depending on window
configuration requirements, we find statistically significant teen wage effects of the
minimum in all configurations except the most restrictive pre-treatment configuration
of 8 years, which reduces our sample to only 4 events.
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We additionally consider how alternative predictor sets affect pooled estimates
of the teen employment and wage effects. Testing four candidate models, we found
in Section 1.4.2 a weak preference for the most saturated model with annualized
outcomes, including both annualized wage and employment outcomes and other labor
market controls. This set of predictors provided all of the above estimates in this
paper. Table 1.9 shows pooled estimates for all of these candidate models in columns
1 through 4. For both teen employment and teen wages, mean elasticities, ranks, and
pooled elasticities change little across predictor sets. Hodges-Lehmann estimates for
employment range from -0.003 to 0.073; for wages, the pooled elasticities lie between
0.265 and 0.294, all of which are statistically significant at the one percent level. With
predictor set 4 (our preferred specification), confidence intervals are somewhat tighter.
One concern with the synthetic control estimator is that by matching on the
levels of wages and employment, we do not positively weight donors that match the
treated state’s trend. For sufficiently many pre-treatment periods, this is less of a
concern, as matching levels or matching trends will produce similar results. But for
a small number of pre-treatment periods, synthetic control estimates may differ. To
assess the magnitude of this problem Table 1.9 presents two additional models, where
we de-mean the data, as in a difference-in-difference specification. Specifically, for
each donor and treated state in a treatment event, we subtract the pre-intervention
mean of each predictor and match on the deviations from this pre-treatment mean.20
Because we do not know the asymptotic properties of this “centered” synthetic control
estimator, we view these results as a robustness check.
We calculate synthetic control estimates for “centered” models using two predictor
sets. Column 5 uses quarterly outcomes and is the “centered” version of the model
20We only use the pre-treatment mean rather than the entire state mean, to avoid any complications
arising from the minimum wage increase affecting the overall mean through the post-treatment
period.
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in column 1. Column 6 uses the most saturated annualized model — the “centered”
version of our preferred specification in column 4. Employment estimates become
slightly more negative: the mean and pooled elasticities rise from -0.039 and -0.003
in our preferred specification, to -0.039 and -0.067 in column 5, to -0.065 and -
0.087 in column 6. These “centered” results are somewhat more consistent with
a small disemployment effect, but the mean ranks are close to 0.45 and 0.43, and
at the five percent level we cannot rule out small positive employment effects. For
wages we find evidence of smaller impacts, with the pooled elasticity falling from
0.265 to 0.211 to 0.163 over specifications 4 through 6. The mean rank for wage
effects remains above 0.66 and statistically significant at the one percent level in all
specifications. On the whole, the “centered” specifications are largely consistent with
our preferred specification’s pattern of small employment effects with sizable and
statistically significant effects on teen wages.
1.5.5 Alternative methods of inference
For multiple case studies, the mean percentile rank is an intuitive test statistic
and is also a natural extension of the donor-based randomization inference proposed
in ADH. The results presented thus far assume that under the sharp null of zero
treatment effects, the mean percentile rank is distributed as the mean of independent
uniform distributions. There are two sets of problems with this assumption. First,
because some of our events contain as little as 20 donors, the mean percentile rank is
too discrete to be assumed to be uniform. In what follows, we assess how our results
change using an alternate “discrete” null distribution of percentile ranks. The second
and more serious set of problems is that because some of our treatment events occur
at the same time period, donor ranks may be correlated across events, violating the
independence assumption. Moreover, recurring treatments may also induce serial
correlation in the donor ranks across time. We assess the extent of this problem
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through a Monte Carlo simulation of synthetic control-based elasticities using placebo
interventions, where the timing, treatment overlap, and donor overlap mimics our
actual 32 treatment events.
We compare our primary results with these two alternative rank-based methods
of conducting inference on the pooled Hodges-Lehmann employment elasticity. In
addition to assessing these three rank-based methods of conducting inference on the
pooled Hodges-Lehmann employment elasticity, we also compare these rank-based
Hodges-Lehmann confidence intervals to a confidence interval for the mean effect
using randomization inference on the means of donor elasticities. These four methods
provide researchers a toolkit of possibilities for conducting inference with synthetic
controls with multiple events. First we describe how we construct three rank-based
counterfactual distributions used to test the sharp null ηe1 = 0 for all N events. Then
we discuss the results of each of these methods and the mean elasticity randomization
inference method.
The first “uniform iid.” method assumes the percentile ranks pe1 of these elasticities
vis-à-vis the donor states are independent uniform variables on [0, 1]. We use one
million simulations of the mean of N uniforms to calculate the 95% critical values
for this Irwin-Hall distribution. Table 1.11 lists these critical values for N = 1 . . . 35.
These are the preferred critical values for the mean percentile rank used throughout
the paper. For the full sample of 32 events, the 5% critical values of this distribution
are 0.400 and 0.600.
The second method recognizes that in practice the percentile ranks are calculated
for a finite, event-specific number Ne of donor states. For this second “discrete iid.”
method we calculate percentile ranks with the Weibull-Gumbel rule pe = re/(Ne + 1)
by simulating the uniform integer ranks re ∈ [1, Ne] with the appropriate number of
donor states present in our data. The distribution of the mean of these percentile
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ranks across 32 treatment events forms the “discrete iid.” counterfactual of the mean
percentile rank.
The third “Monte Carlo overlap” method recognizes that, as described above and
in Section 1.3.3, the set of placebo elasticities is not independently distributed because
some distinct treatments occur around the same time period. For example, the five
states that raise their minimum wages during 2005 share many of the same donors.
Therefore these treatments are associated with similar donor elasticities, inducing a
correlation in donor ranks across this set of events. To account for donor overlap we
use a placebo-law simulation, calculating synthetic controls for teen employment-to-
population ratios in each of the 50 states, using the remaining 49 states as potential
donors. These synthetic controls are constructed using the exact timing and pre-/post-
treatment window length present in our sample of 32 events.21
To form the “Monte Carlo overlap” counterfactual distribution of mean percentile
ranks, we randomly permute state identifiers of the placebo law sample and then merge
the shuffled outcomes and associated synthetic controls to the actual 32 treatment
events. The resulting dataset shares the exact timing and structure of donor overlap
in our actual sample of 32 events, as well as the actual sample’s event-specific pre- and
post-treatment window configurations. The dataset also retains the same structure
of recurring treatments. For each event, and for each “treated” and donor state,
we calculate the percentile ranks of the placebo-treatment effects, defined as the
post-treatment percent difference of employment-to-population ratios between the
state and its synthetic control. Finally, we calculate the mean percentile rank of the
32 “treated” states. We iterate this procedure one million times. Note that although
21For example, Alaska’s treatment event in 2003q1 has a pre-treatment window of 20 quarters and
a post-treatment window 12 quarters (see Table 1.1). For the Monte Carlo simulation we construct
synthetic controls for all 50 states using the same date of treatment and the same pre-/post-treatment
window lengths. We repeat this for all 32 treatment events. For the synthetic control procedure, we
use the preferred predictor set used throughout most of the paper (predictor set 3 in Table 1.3)
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the placebo-law sample contains actually treated states, the resulting distribution
remains a valid counterfactual because all states have the same probability of treatment
assignment, before permuting state identifiers.
Table 1.10 describes all three methods of rank-based inference associated with
our sample’s 32 treatment events. The first column of results lists the 2.5 and 97.5
percentiles of each counterfactual distribution. These 95% critical values are very
similar across methods, with the Monte Carlo method (0.392, 0.607) having the largest
deviation from the uniform-based distribution (0.400, 0.600). In the second column,
we calculate the 5% rejection rates for each counterfactual distribution using the 95%
critical values of uniform-based distribution. By construction, this is exactly 5.0%
for the uniform-based distribution. For the discrete iid. counterfactual, the rejection
rate is similar but slightly lower, at about 4.3%. Finally, for the Monte Carlo overlap
distribution, the rejection rate rises to about 6.9%, suggesting that donor overlap
causes the uniform-based distribution to over-reject somewhat, although the bias is
modest.
To see how these methods affect estimates of the confidence intervals of the
aggregate effects, columns 3-5 show the Hodges-Lehmann point estimate and associated
confidence interval. Here, we form confidence intervals as described in Section 1.3.3 by
inverting the mean rank, but we use the critical values from the respective uniform,
discrete, or Monte Carlo overlap distributions. The 95% Hodges-Lehman elasticity
confidence of (-0.153, 0.104) with the uniform iid. distribution remains essentially
unchanged when using the discrete iid. critical values. Using the Monte Carlo overlap
critical values, the 95% confidence interval widens a small amount to (-0.164, 0.112).
The over-statement in precision due to ignoring overlap therefore appears to be very
small in terms of Hodges-Lehmann confidence intervals: about 0.01 in elasticity space.
These results provide a strong justification for simply using the naive distribution
based on the mean of random uniforms.
35
In the fourth row of Table 1.10 we compare the above results using the Hodges-
Lehmann pooled effect and rank-based inference to randomization inference for the
mean effect. To form randomization-based confidence intervals around the mean
employment elasticity estimate of -0.039, we first construct the counterfactual dis-
tribution of the mean of 32 donor elasticities: we select, at random, one donor from
each of the treatment events, and calculate the mean of the synthetic control-based
elasticities. Repeating this process one million times, we use the resulting 2.5 and 97.5
percentiles of this distribution to calculate the 95% randomization inference confidence
interval. For the mean effect of -0.039, the 95% randomization confidence interval
is (-0.179, 0.137). Slightly wider than than our preferred confidence interval (-0.153,
0.104) around the Hodges-Lehmann point estimate, the randomization inference confi-
dence interval for the mean, based on means of donor elasticities, is somewhat more
influenced by large elasticities in the donor space.
Relatedly, one reason to prefer conducting inference using the mean rank is that
under the independence assumption, we know its exact distribution under the sharp
null of no effects. The sample mean rank is therefore a sufficient statistic. This virtue
cannot be claimed by the sample mean elasticity, whose distribution under the null
is unknown. We must empirically estimate the mean elasticity under the null using
the mean of donor elasticities. A second reason to prefer rank-based inference is that
it allows for conceptually simple tests of the distribution of effects. For example,
given the independence assumption, the percentile ranks of treated states should
follow a uniform distribution under the sharp null. In the next section we extend this
distributional analysis of the percentile ranks to test of heterogenous effects.
1.5.6 Heterogeneity
Thus far we have focused on the average effects of the treatment, and found
employment estimates that are close to zero. However, it is possible that such an
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average effect is composed of causal effects of differing signs. For example, if the
low wage labor market is characterized by monopsonistic competition, employment
effects there could be positive in some cases and negative in others (Card and Krueger
1995, Burdett and Mortensen 1989, Manning 2003). Conversely, the spread in the
estimated elasticities could simply be due to sampling error, with a true effect of zero
everywhere.
Here we take advantage of the fact that the distribution of the percentile ranks
is of a known form under the sharp null hypothesis of a zero effect—it is uniformly
distributed over the unit interval. If the distribution of empirically estimated percentile
ranks differs sufficiently from the theoretical distribution, this constitutes evidence
against the sharp null. This possibility can arise either from a non-zero constant effect
everywhere, or heterogeneous effects across events.
We use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distributions to determine both
the presence of any minimum wage effect and heterogeneous minimum wage effects.
Under the sharp null of zero effects everywhere, ηe = 0, the percentile ranks of the
nineteen treatment effects should be uniformly distributed. The empirical CDF of the
actual percentile ranks is given by
Hˆ(x) = 1
E
∑
e
I(pe1 ≤ x)
where I is the indicator function. The one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the
null hypothesis Hˆ(x) = x has as its test statistic the maximum distance between the
empirical CDF and the uniform CDF (see Gibbons and Chakraborti 2003):
D = sup
x
∣∣∣Hˆ(x)− x∣∣∣ .
The top panel of Figure 1.6 shows the uniform CDF and the empirical CDF for
employment and wages. Visually, the percentile ranks of the employment effects
are very similar to what would be expected under the sharp null, whereas the wage
effects have a different percentile rank distribution. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
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p-values confirm this impression with p = 0.726 for employment and p = 0.000 for
wage elasticity percentile ranks, leading us to reject the sharp null of zero effect only
in case of wages.
The above test is against a sharp null of zero effect. To detect heterogeneous
effects that average to something other than zero, we extend the procedure above
to test for a constant effect equal to the mean effect: ηe = η. This is particularly
relevant for wage elasticities whose average is positive and substantial in magnitude.
Under this sharp null, after centering the 32 elasticities around the mean effect, the
adjusted percentile ranks p˜e1 = Fˆe(ηe1 − η) should be uniformly distributed. The new
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic is
D˜ = sup
x
∣∣∣∣∣ 1E
E∑
e=1
I(p˜e1 ≤ x)− x
∣∣∣∣∣ .
The bottom panel of Figure 1.6 shows the distribution of adjusted percentile ranks
for employment and wage elasticities after centering the effects around their means
of -0.039 and 0.317, respectively. With Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-values of 0.502 for
employment and 0.337 for wages, the re-calculated ranks appear to be uniformly
distributed, revealing no evidence of heterogeneous effects in our sample of treatment
events.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test can be relatively insensitive to distributional dif-
ferences near the tails, because there, by construction, the distributional deviations
converge to zero (as the empirical distributions converge to 0 and 1). We may expect
precisely this kind of heterogeneity if most minimum wage increases have small employ-
ment impacts, but a few sufficiently binding increases lead to large employment effects.
As an alternative test of uniformly distributed ranks p˜e1, we use the Anderson-Darling
test statistic A2, which places relatively more weight on the tails of the distribution
(see Conover 1999):
A2 = −n−
E∑
e=1
2e− 1
E
(
log(p˜e1) + log(1− p˜(E+1−e)1)
)
.
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For completeness we perform this test both for heterogeneous effects (using the de-
meaned percentile ranks p˜e1) and for a constant zero effect (using the original percentile
ranks pe1). As shown in Figure 1.6, the resulting Anderson-Darling tests p-values are
very similar to our previous tests:
In summary, we find that the minimum affects teen wages but no indication
of heterogeneous treatment effects for either teen employment or the average teen
wage. For the events analyzed in this paper, the synthetic control-based estimates are
consistent with a constant positive wage elasticity coupled with a zero employment
elasticity of the minimum wage.
1.6 Conclusion
The appeal of using a data-driven method to choose control groups has led to
the increased popularity of the synthetic control method. Since there may be a
multitude of case studies one can investigate, the ability to pool across events is useful
in many contexts. In this paper we propose and implement and way to pool across
synthetic control case studies. We use a variant of the rank sum test to conduct exact
inference appropriate for small samples. We also invert the mean rank to provide the
Hodges-Lehman confidence interval for the pooled effect.
Although forming placebo-based permutation inference and confidence intervals
is relatively straightforward in the case of a single treatment event, treatment effect
estimates from individual case studies are often imprecise. Pooling across them allows
one to draw economically meaningful inference with, in our case, 32 events. Our mean
employment elasticity is -0.039, and with a 95 percent level of confidence, we reject
teen employment elasticities more negative than -0.153. The Hodges-Lehmann pooled
wage elasticity of 0.265 is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Within the minimum wage literature, our estimates are similar to those from
border discontinuity designs and estimates controlling for time-varying heterogeneity.
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Using CPS data on teens for 1990-2012, Allegretto et al. (2013a) find a similar wage
elasticity (0.167) and also small employment elasticities: 0.002 with spatial controls
and -0.025 with lagged dependent variables. While we cannot rule out moderate
negative employment effects of the minimum wage (say, an elasticity around -0.1),
our pooled estimates are consistent with small teen employment effects and relatively
larger effects on teen wages.
A substantial limitation of pooled synthetic control-based case studies concerns
window length. Due to the nature of minimum wage variation in the United States,
increasing the post-treatment window requirements quickly limits the number of
available case studies and potential donors. Although we find no lagged effects three
years after treatment, focusing on these events cuts our sample in half. Similar
limitations apply to increasing the pre-treatment window in the hope of obtaining
better quality matches. In contrast, a clear advantage of a more conventional regression-
based approach is the greater ease of considering lagged effects. Lagged effects may
be a particularly relevant concern in minimum wage studies when examining whether
the short-term and medium-term employment responses differ. Nevertheless, Dube,
Lester and Reich (2010) find similar results of small employment impacts even when
considering longer lags up to 16 quarters.
Finally, the method we propose for rank-based inference need not be applied to
synthetic control estimates, but instead can be used in other difference-in-difference
settings with multiple treatments. The test we propose for heterogeneity is also more
general, only requiring the empirical distribution of treatment effect ranks. Calculating
and conducting inference on pooled effects is natural once the researcher identifies
treatment events and potential controls. In particular, the mean percentile rank is an
intuitive test statistic with a known distribution that can be derived for a relatively
small number of events.
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Figure 1.1. Forming confidence intervals by inverting the mean rank statistic
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Figure 1.2. Quarterly minimum wage changes and usable treatment events during
1979-2013
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Notes: The top panel displays all quarterly state-level minimum wage changes during the 1979-2013
period, with vertical lines representing the federal minimum wage changes, where bolded states
indicate the first minimum wage rise of the 32 usable treatment events. The bottom panel shows the
pre-treatment (blue) and post-treatment (red) windows of the 32 treatment events, with red circles
showing the minimum wage increases during the post-treatment periods.
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Figure 1.3. Mean annualized elasticities, minimum wage changes, and number of
donors, by time
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Figure 1.4. Event-specific and aggregated elasticities
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Figure 1.5. Probability density functions for the employment and wage elasticities
of donors
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Notes: The donor employment (wage) elasticity distributions have mean -0.012 (0.012), standard
deviation 0.452 (0.565), and kurtosis 5.82 (58.37). For each outcome, the illustrated normal distribu-
tions have the same mean and variance. Shapiro-Wilk normality test p-values are 0.000 for both
outcomes.
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Figure 1.6. Cumulative distribution of estimated percentile ranks
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Notes: The solid line is the cumulative distribution of percentile ranks of the 32 treatment effects, and
the dashed line is the uniform CDF. P-values are for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Anderson-Darling
tests of equality of these two distributions.
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Figure 1.7. Employment and wage elasticities, trimming events on pre-treatment
match quality
Post-treatment elasticities
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N = 0, . . . , 11 events with the highest pre-treatment RMSPE for the actually treated state.
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Table 1.1. Table 1: Usable treatment events
Window length MW increases
Event Pre Post Donors Number Percent
AK 2003q1 20 12 33 1 0.265
CA 1988q3 28 6 36 1 0.269
CA 2001q1 8 12 39 2 0.174
CT 1987q1 24 12 36 3 0.269
CT 2006q1 8 6 21 2 0.077
FL 2005q2 28 8 21 4 0.295
HI 1988q1 28 8 36 1 0.149
HI 2002q1 16 12 38 2 0.190
HI 2006q1 12 6 21 2 0.160
IL 2004q1 24 12 29 2 0.262
MA 1986q3 20 12 39 4 0.119
MA 2000q1 8 12 40 2 0.286
ME 1985q1 16 12 44 3 0.090
ME 2002q1 16 12 38 3 0.233
MN 1988q1 28 8 36 2 0.149
MN 2005q3 28 8 20 2 0.194
NH 1987q1 24 12 36 3 0.090
NJ 2005q4 32 6 21 2 0.388
NY 2005q1 28 10 20 3 0.388
OR 2003q1 16 12 33 3 0.115
PA 1989q1 32 4 36 2 0.104
RI 1986q3 20 12 39 3 0.194
RI 2004q1 12 12 31 3 0.154
RI 2006q1 8 6 21 3 0.096
VT 1986q3 20 12 39 4 0.090
VT 1995q1 12 6 44 2 0.118
VT 1999q4 8 12 40 2 0.190
VT 2004q1 12 12 31 3 0.160
WA 1989q1 32 4 36 1 0.149
WA 1994q1 8 10 44 1 0.153
WI 2005q2 28 8 21 4 0.262
WV 2006q3 32 4 20 1 0.136
Notes: “Pre” and “Post” are the respective pre-treatment and post-treatment window
lengths. Percent minimum wage increase is the percent increase from the pre-treatment
minimum to the maximum post-treatment minimum.
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Table 1.2. Summary of treatment events for more restrictive window configurations
Minimum Window Number of donors Percent MW change
Pre- Post- Events Treated states Min. Mean Max. Min. Mean Max.
8 4 32 19 20 32.5 44 0.077 0.187 0.388
8 8 23 16 20 34.0 44 0.090 0.194 0.388
8 12 16 11 29 36.6 44 0.090 0.180 0.286
16 4 22 19 20 32.1 44 0.090 0.200 0.388
16 8 17 14 20 32.8 44 0.090 0.197 0.388
16 12 11 10 29 36.7 44 0.090 0.174 0.269
24 4 14 13 20 28.9 36 0.090 0.222 0.388
24 8 9 8 20 28.3 36 0.090 0.229 0.388
24 12 3 3 29 33.7 36 0.090 0.207 0.269
32 4 4 4 20 28.2 36 0.104 0.195 0.388
Notes: Each row describes the subset of all 32 events in Table 1.1 with at least the specified number of
pre- and post-treatment quarters.
Table 1.3. Average pre- and post-treatment RMSPE for donors, by model specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment
Pre-treatment 0.0313 0.0400 0.0370 0.0347
Post-treatment 0.0478 0.0507 0.0490 0.0472
Wage
Pre-treatment 0.7084 0.7758 0.7574 0.7356
Post-treatment 0.7911 0.7810 0.7832 0.7758
Predictors
Quarterly outcomes Y
Annualized outcomes Y Y Y
Both annualized outcomes Y Y
Industry & Other controls Y
Notes: The average RMSPE is the square root of the mean of all donors’ MSPEs across all treatment events,
for either the pre- or post-treatment period. Predictor categories are either all quarterly pre-treatment out-
comes (Quarterly), annualized pre-treatment outcomes, both annualized employment and wage pre-treatment
outcomes, or pre-treatment means of industry shares and demographic/labor market variables.
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Table 1.4. Donor weights and distance to treated states
Weights per donor
Donor relation to treatment Inside Outside Relative weight
Employment
Same region 0.050 0.027 1.836
Same division 0.087 0.029 3.039
Within 0 - 500 miles 0.054 0.028 1.932
Within 0 - 1000 miles 0.036 0.028 1.281
Wage
Same region 0.051 0.027 1.872
Same division 0.074 0.029 2.544
Within 0 - 500 miles 0.054 0.028 1.954
Within 0 - 1000 miles 0.039 0.026 1.491
Notes: The inside (outside) weight per donor is equal to the sum across all treatment events
of the weights assigned to donors inside (outside) the specified area, divided by the total
number of inside (outside) donors. Relative weight is the ratio of inside-to-outside weights
per donor. Distance in miles is the distance between population-weighted state centroids.
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Table 1.5. Employment and wage elasticities, by event
Employment Wages
Event Elasticity Rank 90% CI Elasticity Rank 90% CI
AK 2003q1 0.097 0.714 (–0.280, 0.498) 0.540 0.971* ( 0.369, 0.985)
CA 1988q3 0.198 0.763 (–0.355, 0.526) 0.083 0.658 (–1.615, 0.598)
CA 2001q1 –0.200 0.268 (–0.768, 0.398) 0.405 0.951* ( 0.008, 0.758)
CT 1987q1 –0.150 0.211 (–0.593, 0.329) 0.237 0.816 (–0.711, 0.794)
CT 2006q1 0.718 0.826 (–1.004, 2.757) –0.149 0.522 (–2.361, 0.834)
FL 2005q2 –0.129 0.435 (–0.637, 0.381) 0.095 0.870 (–0.086, 0.312)
HI 1988q1 0.312 0.763 (–0.658, 0.928) 0.805 0.921 (–1.481, 1.523)
HI 2002q1 0.149 0.775 (–0.415, 0.705) 0.117 0.800 (–0.299, 0.400)
HI 2006q1 –0.354 0.261 (–1.096, 0.676) 0.473 0.870 (–0.472, 0.978)
IL 2004q1 –0.214 0.258 (–0.661, 0.235) 0.054 0.742 (–0.328, 0.382)
MA 1986q3 –0.015 0.512 (–1.149, 0.998) 1.337 0.951* ( 0.436, 1.996)
MA 2000q1 –0.456 0.024* (–0.834,–0.157) 0.215 0.905 (–0.205, 0.513)
ME 1985q1 0.072 0.543 (–1.003, 1.496) 1.027 0.935 (–0.011, 1.982)
ME 2002q1 0.133 0.775 (–0.328, 0.588) 0.153 0.800 (–0.187, 0.384)
MN 1988q1 0.362 0.789 (–0.607, 0.979) 0.409 0.763 (–1.878, 1.127)
MN 2005q3 –0.089 0.455 (–0.762, 0.750) 0.036 0.682 (–0.292, 0.573)
NH 1987q1 0.256 0.658 (–1.070, 1.693) 1.314 0.895 (–1.528, 2.986)
NJ 2005q4 –0.056 0.478 (–0.377, 0.423) 0.254 0.957* ( 0.118, 0.476)
NY 2005q1 –0.372 0.091 (–0.726, 0.065) 0.126 0.909 (–0.049, 0.274)
OR 2003q1 –1.081 0.029* (–1.889,–0.267) 0.225 0.686 (–0.247, 1.031)
PA 1989q1 0.245 0.684 (–1.197, 2.768) 0.043 0.605 (–8.128, 1.394)
RI 1986q3 0.218 0.707 (–0.479, 0.842) 0.663 0.951* ( 0.108, 1.069)
RI 2004q1 –0.051 0.515 (–0.727, 0.679) 0.130 0.758 (–0.329, 0.777)
RI 2006q1 –0.333 0.391 (–1.719, 1.306) 0.087 0.652 (–1.693, 0.878)
VT 1986q3 0.769 0.854 (–0.742, 2.120) 0.762 0.756 (–0.441, 1.641)
VT 1995q1 –0.689 0.087 (–1.310, 0.216) –0.070 0.543 (–1.147, 0.681)
VT 1999q4 –0.022 0.476 (–0.528, 0.518) 0.506 0.976* ( 0.183, 0.990)
VT 2004q1 0.361 0.818 (–0.292, 1.065) 0.400 0.939 (–0.044, 1.024)
WA 1989q1 0.829 0.947 (–0.181, 2.595) 0.352 0.737 (–5.368, 1.297)
WA 1994q1 –0.580 0.065 (–1.393, 0.022) –0.188 0.239 (–1.022, 0.257)
WI 2005q2 0.038 0.652 (–0.533, 0.613) –0.127 0.304 (–0.330, 0.117)
WV 2006q3 –1.199 0.091 (–2.207, 0.166) –0.162 0.364 (–1.117, 0.836)
Notes: * indicates significance at the 10% level using the percentile rank of the elasticity within the event-specific
donor-based placebo distribution. Inverting this rank obtains 90% CIs.
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Table 1.6. Employment and wage elasticities, pooled
Hodges-Lehmann
Median elasticity Mean elasticity Mean rank Elasticity 95% CI
Employment –0.019 –0.039 0.497 –0.003 (–0.153, 0.104)
Wages 0.220 0.317 0.763*** 0.265 ( 0.174, 0.382)
Notes: Critical values for the mean percentile rank are derived from the mean of 32 uniform distributions.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 1.7. Employment and wage confidence intervals, by pre-treatment donor MSPE
ratios
Donor states Donor state elasticities Treated state elasticities
MSPE Ratio Number Fraction Min Max SD Kurtosis Mean rank 95% CI
Employment
. 1039 1.000 –2.522 1.722 0.452 5.816 0.497 (–0.153, 0.104)
20 1038 0.999 –2.038 1.722 0.445 5.199 0.497 (–0.153, 0.104)
10 1033 0.994 –2.038 1.722 0.442 5.115 0.497 (–0.153, 0.104)
5 987 0.950 –2.038 1.722 0.443 5.125 0.494 (–0.161, 0.103)
2 802 0.772 –2.038 1.722 0.449 5.141 0.502 (–0.155, 0.115)
Wages
. 1039 1.000 –1.671 8.170 0.565 58.371 0.763*** ( 0.174, 0.382)
20 978 0.941 –1.671 3.439 0.426 11.969 0.774*** ( 0.186, 0.387)
10 954 0.918 –1.671 3.439 0.415 12.290 0.777*** ( 0.186, 0.387)
5 912 0.878 –1.671 3.439 0.413 12.594 0.777*** ( 0.178, 0.387)
2 759 0.731 –1.671 3.439 0.417 13.796 0.764*** ( 0.176, 0.389)
Notes: Rows show results for samples where donors limited to those with donor-to-treated MSPE ratios less
than X, where X=. indicates the full sample.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.8. Employment and wage elasticities, by minimal window length
Window length Hodges-Lehmann
Pre- Post- Events Mean elasticity Mean rank Elasticity 95% CI
Employment
. 4 32 –0.039 0.497 –0.003 (–0.153, 0.104)
. 6 29 –0.038 0.489 –0.007 (–0.161, 0.097)
. 8 23 –0.026 0.495 –0.005 (–0.165, 0.121)
. 10 18 –0.060 0.461 –0.062 (–0.242, 0.105)
. 12 16 –0.009 0.509 0.015 (–0.191, 0.161)
8 . 32 –0.039 0.497 –0.003 (–0.153, 0.104)
12 . 26 –0.014 0.533 0.038 (–0.114, 0.165)
16 . 22 0.017 0.554 0.050 (–0.099, 0.196)
20 . 18 0.061 0.559 0.048 (–0.094, 0.218)
24 . 14 0.002 0.520 0.015 (–0.153, 0.206)
28 . 11 0.013 0.559 0.047 (–0.129, 0.260)
32 . 4 –0.045 0.550 0.072 (–0.587, 0.693)
Wages
. 4 32 0.317 0.763*** 0.265 ( 0.174, 0.382)
. 6 29 0.342 0.784*** 0.267 ( 0.176, 0.384)
. 8 23 0.402 0.805*** 0.303 ( 0.184, 0.439)
. 10 18 0.446 0.832*** 0.350 ( 0.208, 0.485)
. 12 16 0.505 0.865*** 0.392 ( 0.256, 0.541)
8 . 32 0.317 0.763*** 0.265 ( 0.174, 0.382)
12 . 26 0.357 0.776*** 0.289 ( 0.168, 0.407)
16 . 22 0.379 0.776*** 0.290 ( 0.158, 0.435)
20 . 18 0.379 0.770*** 0.289 ( 0.145, 0.481)
24 . 14 0.251 0.730*** 0.188 ( 0.060, 0.358)
28 . 11 0.174 0.706** 0.173 ( 0.021, 0.319)
32 . 4 0.122 0.666 0.256 (–0.310, 0.646)
Notes: Window length of X restricts the events to the subset with a pre- or post-period greater than X
quarters, where X = . is eight pre-treatment or four post-treatment quarters. Critical values for the mean
percentile rank are derived from the mean of appropriate number of uniform distributions.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.11. Extrema of the distribution of the mean of N uniformly distributed
random variables
Percentile
N 0.5 2.5 5.0 95.0 97.5 99.5
1 0.005 0.025 0.050 0.950 0.975 0.995
2 0.050 0.111 0.158 0.842 0.888 0.950
3 0.103 0.176 0.223 0.777 0.823 0.896
4 0.147 0.220 0.261 0.738 0.780 0.852
5 0.182 0.249 0.287 0.713 0.751 0.819
6 0.206 0.271 0.305 0.694 0.729 0.793
7 0.227 0.288 0.320 0.680 0.712 0.774
8 0.244 0.301 0.332 0.668 0.699 0.757
9 0.258 0.312 0.341 0.658 0.687 0.743
10 0.269 0.322 0.350 0.650 0.678 0.731
11 0.280 0.330 0.357 0.643 0.670 0.720
12 0.289 0.337 0.363 0.637 0.663 0.711
13 0.297 0.344 0.368 0.632 0.656 0.703
14 0.304 0.349 0.373 0.627 0.651 0.696
15 0.311 0.354 0.377 0.623 0.646 0.689
16 0.317 0.359 0.381 0.619 0.641 0.683
17 0.322 0.363 0.385 0.615 0.637 0.679
18 0.327 0.367 0.388 0.612 0.633 0.673
19 0.331 0.370 0.391 0.609 0.630 0.669
20 0.335 0.374 0.394 0.606 0.626 0.665
21 0.339 0.377 0.396 0.604 0.623 0.660
22 0.343 0.379 0.398 0.601 0.620 0.657
23 0.346 0.382 0.401 0.599 0.618 0.654
24 0.349 0.384 0.403 0.597 0.615 0.650
25 0.352 0.387 0.405 0.595 0.613 0.647
26 0.355 0.389 0.407 0.593 0.611 0.645
27 0.358 0.391 0.408 0.591 0.609 0.642
28 0.360 0.393 0.410 0.590 0.607 0.639
29 0.363 0.395 0.412 0.588 0.605 0.637
30 0.365 0.397 0.413 0.587 0.603 0.635
31 0.367 0.398 0.415 0.585 0.601 0.632
32 0.369 0.400 0.416 0.584 0.600 0.630
33 0.371 0.401 0.417 0.583 0.598 0.628
34 0.373 0.403 0.418 0.581 0.597 0.627
35 0.375 0.404 0.420 0.580 0.595 0.625
Notes: Simulated using one million iterations of the mean of N uniformly distributed
variables on [0, 1].
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CHAPTER 2
HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF THE BITE OF THE
MINIMUM WAGE
2.1 Introduction
The most credible estimates of minimum wage effects focus on the average treatment
effect, necessarily failing to shed light on how minimum wage impacts vary with the
state of the labor market. In particular, how different are the employment effects
for areas with already low wages? Contemporary policy discussions of the minimum
wage observe that the generally “modest increases” in the US minimum wage have no
major disemployment effects (Schmitt, 2013). But how do variations in the “bite” of
minimum wage into the underlying wage distribution modify this conclusion? This
question is of particular relevance for the political process, as the minimum-to-average
wage ratio both guides policy making (Elwell, 2013) and forms a reference point for
public concerns of fairness (Green and Harrison, 2010).
Several examples in the empirical literature suggest that more binding minimum
wages have stronger disemployment effects. Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992)
provide evidence that Puerto Rico’s deeply binding minimum wage severely constrained
employment, and Thompson (2009) shows that after the 1996-1997 US federal minimum
wage change, areas with low pre-intervention wages – where the new minimum is
most binding – faced larger employment falls, relative to high wage areas. Abowd et
al. (2000) finds evidence of minimum-wage induced disemployment in France, with a
minimum-to-median wage ratio of over 0.60 in recent years, but no such evidence for
the US, with an equivalent ratio of under 0.40. In contrast to previous work which
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estimates an average treatment effect, this paper estimates the marginal treatment
effect (MTE) of the minimum wage as it varies with respect to the underlying wage
distribution. I use the “bite” of the minimum as my key treatment variable, as measured
by the local minimum-to-median wage ratio, which approximates the proportion of
the workforce earning near the minimum. Economic theory suggests that the relative
location of the minimum matters, as in dynamic search models, where the treatment
effect on the treated depends on the relative location in the productivity distribution,
as in Bontemps et al. (1999). A key contribution of this paper is to estimate minimum
wage elasticities at various minimum-to-median wage ratios, statistics of interest for
both the academic literature and policy community.
In a border discontinuity study of county-level data on restaurants, I find that
restaurant workers have larger elasticities of earnings in counties where the minimum
wage binds more. For counties with minimum-to-median wage ratios of 0.32, I estimate
that the earnings elasticity is 0.105-0.110, depending on the specification, but is 0.323-
0.331 in counties with minimum-to-median wage ratios of 0.52. All of the differences
in earnings elasticities are highly statistically significant. For employment, I find
suggestions that disemployment effects grow modestly in counties with lower median
wages, where the minimum binds more. Where the minimum-to-median wage ratio is
about 0.32, I estimate the elasticity of restaurant employment to be between -0.028
and -0.035; at a minimum-to-median wage ratio of 0.52, the employment elasticity
ranges from -0.096 to -0.110. Employment results are nevertheless very imprecise —
none of these employment elasticities is statistically significant at conventional levels.
At a high minimum-tomedian wage ratio of 0.52, the 95% confidence interval for the
employment elasticity of -0.096 is (-0.355, 0.167).
Importantly, I find relatively constant labor demand elasticity estimates along a
wide range of minimum-to-median wage ratios. Between minimum-to-median wage
ratios of 0.32 and 0.52, the labor demand elasticity estimates range from a low of
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-0.242 to a high of -0.343. Many of these labor demand elasticity estimates are
statistically below unitary elastic labor demand, where negative employment effects
outweigh earnings effects. For example, at a minimum-to-median wage ratio of 0.52,
at the five percent level I rule out labor demand elasticities more negative than -0.63.
The narrow range of labor demand elasticity point estimates suggests that increased
employment responses are due simply to increased coverage of the minimum, as
opposed to nonlinear responses in labor demand.
Using the incidence of the minimum wage to identify policy effects has a long
history in labor economics, in particular the large set of studies using some version of
the Kaitz (1970) index, a weighted ratio of the minimum to average wage. Endogeneity
concerns with this index, increased data availability, and greater statutory minimum
wage variation eventually led economists to use simply the minimum wage level as the
key independent variable in identifying the treatment effect. While the level of the
minimum can still identify the average treatment effect, the level is less appropriate
for estimating the marginal treatment effect when the economically relevant treatment
is the actual “bite.” This problem may be particularly severe in the US context, where
legislated minimum wages are correlated with latent wages. As a result, using the
minimum wage level or using the minimum wage “bite” results in different treatment
intensities. In a worst case scenario, the treatment intensity order is reversed: small
increases in the minimum of low-wage areas can imply large increases in the minimum’s
“bite”, whereas larger minimum wage increases in high-wage areas can translate into
smaller increases in the “bite.”
For instance, examine the hypothetical minimum wage increases in Table 2.1 for
low-wage area A and high-wage area B. For simplicity, both areas exhibit no movement
in the median wage. Area A increases its low minimum wage by 25 percent and
high-wage area B has a sharper increase of 40 percent. At the same time, Area A’s
minimum-to-median wage ratio rises from 0.40 to 0.50, but Area B’s ratio stays within
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the range of 0.25 to 0.35. Consider the possibility that the minimum wage has no
employment effects when the minimum is relatively low compared to the median, but
disemployment effects begin to “kick in” at minimum-to-median wage ratios greater
than 0.35, In that stark case, specifications using simply the minimum wage level will
mistakenly identify larger disemployment effects with smaller minimum wage increases.
In general, relative movements in the level of the minimum wage credibly establish an
average treatment effect, but when estimating the MTE, these level differences may
order treatment intensity differently than orders of treatment intensity that account
for the “bite” of the minimum wage, as measured by the distance of the minimum
from the median wage.
Using the American Community Survey and Census data to construct county
median wages, I define the measure of bindingness to be the state log minimum minus
the county log median wage, which I call the log of the Kaitz index. To allow the effect
of the minimum to vary by bindingness, I regress county-level restaurant outcomes
on linear and quadratic terms of the Kaitz. This approach is similar to those of
Lee (1999) and Autor, Manning and Smith (2010) who use the state median-deflated
minimum wage in their studies of the minimum wage on inequality and spillover effects
to the rest of the wage distribution. This paper improves upon the existing literature
using by exploiting local area comparisons, in the style of Dube, Lester and Reich
(2010), both to form more appropriate employment counterfactuals and also to create
instruments to overcome the potential endogeneity of the median wage as part of
the treatment variable. I construct three sets of instruments for the log of the Kaitz
index, by subtracting from the own-county log minimum either (1) the county-pair
time-specific mean log median wage, (2) the county-pair mean log median wage, or
(3) own-county mean log median wage. By limiting identifying information to local
area comparisons, I dispense with the strong requirement that all states form equally
good counterfactuals for each other. By using instruments for the Kaitz index, I avoid
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confounding movements in the Kaitz index with demand shocks that affect both the
median wage and restaurant outcomes. Also in contrast to Lee (1999) and Autor,
Manning and Smith (2010), which are concerned with the average treatment effect, I
explicitly explore nonlinear effects by calculating the MTE of the minimum wage at
different values of the minimum-to-median wage ratio.
2.2 Heterogeneity in theory
Early debates on the minimum wage recognized that heterogeneity in the labor
market complicates the effects of a wage floor (Lees-Smith, 1907). Historically,
minimum wage coverage was not universal, and under such circumstances the aggregate
effect of the minimum wage on employment depends on the relative size of the covered
sector, as in the two-sector model of Welch (1974). In such cases, the treatment
effect on the treated is generally constant, but the average treatment effect increases
directly with the proportion of the labor force whose current wages fall short of
the new minimum. Motivated by this concern, treatment variables in early studies
were often some form of the Kaitz (1970) index, a coverage-weighted ratio of the
minimum-to-average wage.1 More relevant for the contemporary U.S. context are
observations that the presence of worker heterogeneity alters the minimum wage’s
effects according to workers’ locations in the wage distribution. In the one-factor
human capital model in Card and Krueger (1995), the distribution of worker skill
mirrors the distribution of wages, and firms choose the optimal stock of total human
capital.2 Workers with wages very low relative to an imposed minimum wage are least
1An equally important motivation was the lack of available data. In early US studies, the only
variation in the federally-legislated minimum wage was its change across time. Teen wage data were
also generally unavailable, and the Kaitz index was thought of as a proxy for the relative price of teen
labor. Card and Krueger (1995), however, demonstrate that the index can be negatively correlated
with teenage wages and that its use obscures the source of the identifying variation (see pp. 183-186
and pp. 215-217).
2See pp. 360-364.
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likely to maintain employment, but those workers with wages just near the minimum
are more likely to continue working at a higher wage. In this model, the relative
position of the minimum wage and the shape of the wage distribution determines the
size of the employment effects.
A somewhat different possibility is that the treatment effect on the treated varies
depending on the location of the minimum. Stigler (1946) observes that a minimum
wage that generates negligible disemployment effects necessarily “varies among firms ...
varies with occupation ... [and] varies, often rapidly, through time.” Stigler’s point of
reference is the wage-setting employer in static textbook model of monopsony, whose
marginal cost of labor exceeds the supply price. In this partial equilibrium model,
minimum wages increase employment if set between the monopsonistic and perfectly
competitive wages, but they decrease employment if set above the competitive wage.
In flow-based models of the labor market (Burdett and Mortensen, 1989), employ-
ment effects generally occur through the minimum wage’s influence on transition rates
into employment. Total transitions into and out of employment are equal at equilib-
rium, and call these respective average flow rates be λ and σ so that the steady-state
employment rate e satisfies λ(1− e) = σe. Writing the elasticity of a variable X with
respect to the minimum wage as Xˆ = d logX/d logMW , the employment elasticity
at equilibrium is therefore
eˆ = (λˆ− σˆ)(1− e).
If most transitions to non-employment are unrelated to the minimum wage – say,
if unemployment is the result of exogenous job destruction – then σˆ ≈ 0 and the
sign of employment elasticity depends solely on how minimum wages affect the
nonemployment-to-employment transition rate λ.
In the job-ladder-based search model of Bontemps et al. (1999), for example, firms
that are heterogeneous in their potential productivity decide to post wage offers to
heterogeneous workers, and λ is the arrival rate of job offers acceptable to the then-
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unemployed. The number of active firms is endogenous: a firm becomes inactive if it
cannot find workers at wages below that firm’s potential productivity. The successful
equilibrium contact rate depends both on the supply of labor and the supply of firms.
On the one hand, an increase in the minimum wage compels firms to raise offered
wages, raising the contact rate and inducing a greater number of potential workers to
join the pool of the employed. On the other hand, a rise in the wage floor forces the
closure of low-productivity firms, reducing the number of job matches and lowering
employment. In this model, minimum wage effects on employment are heterogeneous
and depend on the relation between the minimum wage and the latent productivity
schedule of firms. Relatively modest increases in the minimum wage may have positive
employment effects, whereas larger increases may cause the firm-destruction effect to
dominate.
2.3 Existing literature
Most empirical studies using the incidence of the minimum wage to study its
labor market effects use some version of the Kaitz index, a coverage-weighted ratio
of the minimum wage to overall average wage. A major weakness of the Kaitz
index stems from the fact that its coverage weights and its denominator may be
endogenous: demand shocks, for instance, affect both the denominator of the Kaitz
and employment. Aware of these problems, Card (1992) examines the impact of the
U.S. federal minimum wage change in 1990 by observing that the uniform change in
the minimum will affect state teen employment rates differently to the extent that
states vary in the 1989 fraction of teen workers earning below the new minimum.The
author finds that, contrary to expectations, a grouped analysis of high-, medium-,
and low-impact states provides evidence that that high-impact states had slightly
better employment outcomes than low-impact states, with no difference between
medium- and low-impact states. Using the continuous variation in the pre-intervention
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fraction of affected workers in a regression framework, the study also does not uncover
significant disemployment effects.
Although disemployment effects may have historically been negligible, perhaps
effects consistent with the conventional neoclassical model begin to “kick in” at high
relative levels of the minimum. Motivated by this possibility, Castillo-Freeman and
Freeman (1992) investigate the Puerto Rico minimum wage. By 1980, the U.S.-
mainland-imposed minimum wage in Puerto Rico generated a coverage-weighted Kaitz
index of about 48 percent, compared to an index of 27 percent in the rest of the United
States. The authors conclude that the minimum accounted for 38 percent of 5.2
percentage point fall in the Puerto Rican employment-to-population during the 1973-
1987 period; effects would have been much larger in the absence of migration. Krueger
(1994), however, shows that these results are not robust to plausible specification
changes, including weighting.
Closest in spirit to my paper is Thompson (2009), who modifies the strategy of
Card (1992) by using average teen earnings to delineate high- and low-impact counties
in a study of the 1996 and 1997 federal minimum wage changes. Here, counties
are high-impact if they have low teen earnings before the 1996 increase. Thompson
calculates pre-intervention average teen quarterly earnings in the counties of the 15
states for which the federal minimum is binding, and then he restricts his attention to
the bottom third and and top third of the overall average teen earnings distribution.
Using a difference-in-difference model, Thompson finds large negative effects on the
teenage share of total employment in relatively high-impact areas, with an estimated
elasticity of roughly -0.28. Exploiting the QWI data for counts of employment that
last less than one quarter, Thompson finds that the negative effects on overall teen
employment fall exclusively on the short-term teen employment share, with little-to-no
change in stable (not short-term) teen employment. For the 1997 federal minimum
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wage increase, the estimated “transient” employment elasticity is between -0.69 and
-1.05.
Of particular concern in Thompson’s study is whether low- and high-teen-earnings
areas have the same counterfactual teen employment paths. Thompson addresses
this potential complication through a post-intervention placebo test that measures
the employment change in 1999-2000, and he notes that almost none of the placebo
estimates are statistically significant.3 Nevertheless, some of the point estimates in
his Table 5 are not reassuring: assuming a 10 percent minimum wage increase, the
implied placebo elasticities, although imprecise, are about +0.17 for overall teen
employment and about +0.23 for stable teen employment. Thompson also calculates
average earnings responses to the actual 1996-1997 interventions and finds very large
elasticities, between +0.67 and +1.48. Concerned that these earnings estimates are
“implausibly large,” Thompson argues that because he is comparing high- and low-
impact groups, mean-reversion may bias his results on earnings — “a before and after
regression will tend to show an increase in earnings even if no policy change occurs” —
and notes that mean-reversion “would have the opposite impact on the employment
results, producing attenuation bias.” However, Thompson’s results are consistent with
a mean reversion that biases the employment estimate to be more negative. Under
mean-reversion, groups that identified as high-impact (low average earnings) groups
would be lower impact groups (higher average earings) in the second period, due to
rise in average earnings. Recall that average earnings is the ratio
Total teen earnings
Total teen employment
As a result, the mean reversion can be accomplished either through a rise in teen
earnings, as suggested by Thompson, or also a fall in teen employment. In the latter
case, mean reversion biases the employment elasticity estimate to be more negative.
3Data availability precludes Thompson from a pre-intervention placebo test.
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An important contribution of the current paper is that I rehabilitate the Kaitz
index, in the form of the log of the minimum-to-median wage ratio. Using this index
to assess treatment intensity allows me to construct marginal treatment effects at
points of natural interest along the wage distribution. Card (1992) and Thompson
(2009) attempt to assess whether minimum wage effects are different for, say, high-
and low-wage impact areas, and Thompson (2009)’s difference-in-difference strategy
in principle allows him to identify the an average difference of effects between these
two areas. In contrast I identify minimum wage employment and earnings elasticities
for specific values of minimum-to-median wage ratios.
In resurrecting the Kaitz index, I adopt an empirical strategy that avoids common
pitfalls in previous work. Using the overall median wage as a deflator has the particular
advantage that, unlike the mean wage, minimum wages presumably do not affect
the overall median. I also combine the cross-border county analysis of Dube et al.
(2010) with an instrumental variables strategy using county-pair-median and county
median wages. Using local area comparisons and state border discontinuities allows
me construct control groups so that prior or average median wages are uncorrelated
with contemporanous residual shocks to employment or earnings. The disadvantage
of the the minimum-to-median wage ratio is that for areas and time periods with
similar minimum wages, it is precisely movements in the median wage that identify
the estimated estimates. If the median wage is not plausibly exogenous — due to,
say, demand shocks affecting both employment and the median — it remains difficult
to interpret the key coefficient as a causal effect of the minimum wage. By using
instrumental variables, I purge bias resulting from residual demand shocks that affect
both contemporaneous median wages and employment or earnings.
2.4 Empirical strategy
Consider the conventional two-way fixed effects model of county level employment
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Yit = βwmit + ΛXit + ρi + τt + it
with county-level fixed effects ρi and time fixed effects τt. Here, the outcomeY is
log of county employment and wm is the log of the state minimum wage, so that β
represents the employment elasticity with respect to the minimum. Conditional on a
vector of other time-varying controls Xit, unbiased estimates of the elasticity require
that the minimum wm and employment shocks  are uncorrelated after sweeping out
place and time fixed effects. Dube et al. (2010) provide strong evidence that this
assumption does not hold for minimum wage changes in US. In particular, using three
years of leads of minimum wage terms the authors find large pre-treatment effects:
the conventional two-way fixed effects model implies that the restaurant employment
elasticity is -0.194 one year prior to an actual minimum wage increase (see their Table
3). These spurious results imply that minimum wage raising areas exhibit different
counterfactual employment trends than areas that do not raise their minimum wage.
Allegretto et al. (2013a) confirm this fact directly, observing that states with higher
minimum wages have sharper recessions.
To control for such spatial heterogeneity, Dube et al. (2010) propose using a border
discontinuity strategy and limit comparisons to all pairs of contiguous counties that
straddle state borders:
Yit = βwmit + ΛXit + ρi + τpt + it (2.1)
By replacing common time effects τt with county pair-specific time effects τpt, the
border county specification controls for local demand shocks that confound conventional
two-way fixed effects model. This regression specification effectively generalizes Card
and Krueger (1994)’s pioneering minimum study of neighboring New Jersey and
Pennsylvania. Dube et al. (2010) find that in contrast to the conventional two-way
fixed effects estimator, within-county-pair comparisons perform well on the falsification
test of leaded effects and estimate sizable earnings impacts. Moreover, introducing
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pair-specific time effects reduces the border county restaurant employment elasticity
from -0.112 (standard error 0.076) to 0.016 (standard error 0.098). I confirm the
general tenor of these findings for the sample of border counties in this paper —
although my sample uses a slightly different definition of restaurants and includes
more years — with common time effects, the employment elasticity is -0.151 (standard
error 0.070), but with pair-specific time effects, the elasticity falls by 62 percent to
-0.057 (standard error 0.059). With statistical confidence of 95%, the cross-border
county research design rules out employment elasticities more negative than -0.18 in
both my smaller sample and the sample of Dube et al. (2010).
In this paper I extend the model in equation 2.1 to allow minimum wage effects
to vary by treatment intensity. A simple modification to equation 2.1 is to allow
the marginal effect β to be non-constant by including a quadratic minimum wage
term or estimating some other nonlinear function of the minimum wage level. As I
discussed earlier, this approach may quickly run into difficulties when the economic
relevant treatment depends on the minimum’s relative position in the underlying wage
distribution. Supposing that the true data generating process is a nonlinear function
of the minimum and median
Yit = f(wmit , w50it ) + ....
Then the linear equation 2.1 still identifies an average treatment effect because the
minimum and median wages are unrelated in the border county discontinuity research
design. Indeed, with an outcome of log median wage and controls for county pair-
specific time fixed effects and county fixed effects, the coefficient on the log minimum
wage term is very small -0.002 (standard error 0.018). In this case, the average
treatment effect is some variance-weighted average of the marginal treatment effects.
Including nonlinear terms of only minimum wage level, however, may give a misleading
estimate of the nonlinear effects, as illustrated previously in Table 2.1.
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To correctly order the treatment intensity, I therefore measure how deeply the
minimum wage cuts into the underlying wage distribution. My measure of the “bite”
of the minimum wage is the same as Lee (1999) and Autor et al. (2010): the log
difference of the minimum and median wage, what I will refer to as the log of the
Kaitz index. Specifically I estimate the equation
Yit = β1(wmit − w50it ) + β2(wmit − w50it )2 + ΛXit + ρi + τpt + it. (2.2)
Autor et al. (2010) present state-level evidence that the effects of the minimum wage
fail to reach all the way to median wage, and in my primary regression sample I
find that the county minimum and median are unrelated: using equation 2.1 with
my preferred set of controls and the log median wage as the outcome, the implied
median wage elasticity of the minimum wage is small and statistically significant at
0.013 (standard error 0.019). Because the minimum does not affect median, one can
plausibly interpret β1 and β2 as measuring the minimum wage elasticity. Specifically,
the elasticity of the outcome with respect to the minimum wage is the marginal effect
∂Y/∂wm = β1 + 2β2(wm − w50).
Equation 2.1 thus allows the minimum wage elasticity to be function of the “bite” of
the minimum.
The border county research design removes the first-order bias affecting the conven-
tional two-way fixed effects estimates of β through local de-meaning: residual shocks
to county employment are likely to be uncorrelated with state-level minimum wage
differences between cross-border counties. In model of Dube et al. (2010) described by
equation 2.1, the key identifying assumption is
Cov[wmit , it|ρi, τpt] = 0. (2.3)
While minimum wage differences within pairs may be unrelated to residual employment
differences within pairs, there is little reason to assume the same of differences in the
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Kaitz index. An unobserved demand shock to one county that increases both median
wages and employment may be precisely why residual outcomes differ. Even though
the shock is unrelated to minimum wage levels it is, by construction, correlated with
the median-deflated minimum wage. Because of this concern about omitted variables
bias, I pursue an instrumental variables strategy to identify movements in the Kaitz
index unrelated to residual employment shocks. I consider three sets of instruments
for the β1 and β2 terms in equation 2.2, each defined by how they modify the median
wage term w50it .
For my first set of instruments I use minimum wages deflated by pair-time-specific
median wages. For these instruments to be unrelated to idiosyncratic employment
shocks, it is sufficient to assume that the standard border county identification
assumption in equation 2.3 also holds for each pair-specific median wage To see this,
for a given a pair of counties i and i′ define county pair-time-specific median wages
w50pt to be the time specific mean the counties’ median wages w50it and w50i′t. Then write
the instruments Z1 = wmit − w50pt and Z21 = (wmit − w50pt )2. Using these instruments, the
reduced form for the structural equation 2.2 is simply
Yit = β˜1(wmit − w50pt ) + β˜2(wmit − w50pt )2 + Λ˜Xit + ρ˜i + τ˜pt + ˜it. (2.4)
Now, the linear term β˜1 is identified because of assumption 2.3 and because county
pair-time-specific de-meaning eliminates the (pair-specific) median wage. Expand the
second term to (wmit )2 − 2wmitw50pt + (w50pt )2. If we reasonably assume that differences
in the square of the state minimum are unrleated to employment differences within
county pairs
Cov[(wmit )2, ˜it|ρ˜i, τ˜pt] = 0. (2.5)
county pair-time-specific demeaning eliminates (w50pt )2, and we are left with the inter-
action term wmitw50pt . To identify β˜2 we require that
Cov[wmitw50pt , ˜it|ρ˜i, τ˜pt] = 0.
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For a variable Wit, write the pair-time-specific and county de-meaning as ∆Wit =
Wit −Wpt −Wi +Wp. Here, Wi and Wp are the own-county and mean pair values of
Wit. Then after de-meaning by the fixed effects and because E[˜it] = 0 by construction,
we have
Cov[wmitw50pt , ˜it|ρ˜i, τ˜pt] = Cov[w50pt (∆wmit ),∆˜it]
= E[w50pt (∆wmit )(∆˜it)]
= E[E[w50pt (∆wmit )(∆˜it)|w50pt ]].
Therefore, to identify β˜2 it is now sufficient to assume that the conventional border
county assumptions in equation 2.3 also hold within each county-pair-time period, so
that
E[w50pt (∆wmit )(∆˜it)|w50pt ] = 0. (2.6)
In practice the instruments Z1, Z21 leading to relatively weak first stages.
Consequently I pursue a second instrument set based on mean own-county deflated
minimum wages: Z2 = wmit − w50i and Z22 = (wmit − w50i )2. This is similar to the IV
approach Autor et al. (2010) use in reducing division bias in their state-level study of
wage inequality: one of their instruments is the interaction of state-level minimum and
average median wages: wmstw50s . In practice I find much stronger first stages from the
Z2, Z
2
2 instrument set. However, the a priori validity of the identification assumptions
is less clear. Formally, to identify the quadratic term in the reduced form equation,
we must have
Cov[wmitw50i , ˜it|ρ˜i, τ˜pt] =
1
2Cov[(w
50
i (wmit − wmi )− w50i′ (wmi′t − wmi′ ),∆˜it)]
= E[w50i (∆wmit )(∆˜it)]−
1
2E[(w
50
i′ − w50i )(wmi′t − wmit )(∆˜it)].
Thus, conditional on paired counties i and i′ having the same minimum wage, second
expectation term disappears, and the identification assumptions are similar to those
above: it suffices that the conventional border county assumption holds for every
71
average own-county median wage level. However, for counties in a pair with different
median wages, the second expectation term does not vanish. The size of bias due to
the second term shrinks the more similar are counties in a pair in average median
wage levels. In my primary sample of border counties, I find that the mean difference
in county average log median wages is 0.092.
The trade-off between the plausibility of identification assumptions and the first-
stage strength of the instruments makes the selection of the “best” instrument unclear.
I therefore present results from both sets of instruments. Each of the sets of instruments
just-identify the endogenous variables. I also consider a third instrument set, consisting
of all four terms, which I estimate by both 2SLS and LIML. I also show how well each
set performs on falsification tests of detecting employment effects in the construction
and overall private sectors, where, because of the low density of minimum wage workers,
minimum wage effects should in principle be very small. I additionally examine a
leaded effects falsification test to see if the conventional border county identification
assumption holds within county pairs with high- and low-median wages.
2.5 Minimum wages, median wages, and the border county
sample
My primary sample of county-level data are all border counties in cross-state pairs
for which I can obtain a full information from the Quarterly Census of Employmetn
and Wages (QCEW) on quarterly restaurant employment and earnings information
during the 1990-2012 period.4 I focus on restaurants because of their intensive use of
minimum wage workers. Allegretto et al. (2013a) report that during 2000-2011, more
than one-fifth of restaurant workers earned within ten percent of the minimum wage.
I define the restaurant sector as NAICS 722, which is defined consistently across all of
4The QCEW data is available at http://www.bls.gov/cew/datatoc.htm.
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the sample years; this is the same sector used in Dube et al. (2013). I report results
for quarterly employment levels and average earnings, where the latter is defined as
total county restaurant sector earnings divided by restaurant employment.
To calculate county-level median wages, I use individual-level data from the 1990
and 2000 decennial Census and the 2005-2012 American Community Survey (ACS).
For my primary sample, I linearally interpolate the median wage for all intervening
years; because of this, I also show how sensitive my results are to using the 1990, 2000,
2005-2012 data without interpolation. I assign PUMA identifiers in these data to
counties and construct annual median wages from earnings, hours, and weeks worked.5
I likely generate considerable error using these data, a matter of potential consequence
for both the out-of-sample relevance of my paper and the bias the measurement error
generates in my estimates. First, not all PUMAS correspond to unique counties, and for
PUMAS corresponding to multiple counties, I assign individuals to multiple counties
before computing the median wage. As a result, I surely assign some individuals to
incorrect nearby counties, although the nature of the data permits me to assign the
correct state identifier. The ACS data also refer to earnings and hours in the “previous
12 months,” but no information is available to which that range specifically refers. I
choose to code wages as referring to the survey year. Additionally, for the 2008-2011
ACS, only intervaled hours are available, so I choose the midpoint of each interval to
construct an hours estimate. I drop all self-employed workers, and I limit my wage
sample to those working full-time, at least 35 hours per week. Using the full-time
median wage allows me to present minimum-to-median wage ratios that are most
comparable to those used in policy discussions: the OECD, for example, publishes
international comparisons of minimum-to-average wage ratios for full-time workers.6
5ACS data prior to 2005 does not contain PUMA identifiers. I use the IPUMS extracts of the
Census and ACS microdata, available at https://usa.ipums.org/usa/.
6See the table “Minimum relative to average wages of full-time workers” available at http:
//stats.oecd.org/.
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In addition to the county-level restaurant outcomes, state-level minimum wages,
and county-level median wages, my primary specification
Yit = β1(wmit − w50it ) + β2(wmit − w50it )2 + ΛXit + ρi + τpt + it. (2.7)
includes right-hand side controls for the log of the county-level quarterly employment
for the overall private sector (QCEW), log of county-level overall annual population
level (Census), and the annual teen population share within the county (Census).7
Because the appeal of the border county discontinuity design relies on the similarity
of nearby counties, I restrict my primary sample to counties that are actually nearby,
so that their 2010 population-weighted centroids are not more distant than 75 miles.8
I later explore how sensitive my results are to these control variables and sample
definitions.
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of minimum wages, median wages, and minimum-
to-median wage ratios for counties in my primary border county sample. The sample
consists of 460 counties and 380 cross-border county pairs. The top panel of the
Figure divides counties into equal groups of high and low mean real minimum wages.
Minimum wages for counties are generally highest in the northeastern US and also in
some northwestern counties, whereas low minimum wages are more prevalent in the
southern and central US. Median wages, in the second panel, generally follow a similar
pattern. As a result, areas with high minimum wages do not necessarily have the
highest binding minimum wages. The bottom panel shows that northeastern counties
have high mean minimum-to-median ratios, above the 0.440 median. Southern and
central countries generally have lower Kaitz indices. These patterns confirm that
7Census population data are available at http://www.census.gov/popest/.
8To create the paired border county sample, I use the Census county adjacency file, available
at http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/county-adjacency.html. Dube et al. (2013) use a
placebo treatment exercise to show that a distance of 75 minimizes regression coefficent mean squared
error for teen and restaurant outcomes.
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focusing on minimum wage levels only may provide a misleading measure of treatment
intensity.
To provide reasonable out-of-sample predictions, the treatment variables in my
county-level data should align well with the patterns in national data. Figure 2.1
shows how the minimum, median, and minimum-to-median ratios compare between
the mean values in my border county sample and the mean population-weighted values
available using national data from the Current Population Survey.9 The national mean
of the real statutory minimum wage fell from a high of $8.56 in 1979 (in 2012$) to a low
of $6.31 in 1989 and then eventually rose to its most recent peak of $7.81 in 2009. The
scatterplot in the top panel of Figure 2.1 illustrates that my primary sample’s statutory
minimum wage tracks these changes quite well, indicating that these border counties
have minimum wages similar to most states, on average. The second panel of Figure
2.1 plots the trend in real full-time median wages. The US average median wage $16.68
during the 1980s and experienced no growth to its average value of $16.70 during the
1990s. Median wages then grew in the late 1990s and early 2000s and increased this
value by 8.6 percent to the $18.13 average during 2000-2009.10 Compared to national
data, median wages in the the border county sample are somewhat lower, although
they do follow the same trend in overlapping years. The largest discrepancy is in
1990, when I estimate the national median wage to be $16.67, but the mean border
county median wage is $15.38, a 7.1 percent difference. For this reason my sensitivity
analysis also includes a specification where I exclude data from 1990. The national
minimum-to-median wage ratio, illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 2.1 fell from
9For this calculation I use the NBER Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the Current Population
Survey data, available at http://www.nber.org/morg/annual/. I calculate hourly wages for full-
time, non-self-employed workers, and use the sample weights to calculate the mean statutory minimum
wage and the median wage.
10Mishel and Gee (2012)’s real median wage series for all workers, including those working less
than full-time, shows similar growth rates: 1.3 percent between the mean values of the 1980s and
1990s, and 8.3 percent between the mean value of the 1990s and 2000s (see their Appendix Table 1).
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0.508 in 1979 to around a mean of 0.40 in the late 1980s and early 1990s, roughly
where it has stayed for much of past 25 years. The minimum-to-median ratio achieved
its absolute nadir of 0.367 in 2004. Due to having lower minimum wages, the mean
border county Kaitz index is generally higher than the national sample, but the series
exhibits the same general trend. The largest discrepancy is again in 1990, where the
national Kaitz is 0.389 and border county Kaitz is 0.431.
In addition to following national trends, the cross-sectional distribution of my
sample spans the historical range of the minimum-to-median wage ratio. Table 2.2
shows that 90 percent of the border county sample has a Kaitz index between 0.284
and 0.543, with a sample mean of 0.422. This range comprises the maximal set of
Kaitz indices about which I expect my regression specifications to be informative.
In general, I report marginal effects at minimum-to-median wage ratio of 0.32, 0.42,
and 0.52, which roughly correspond to 10th percentile, mean, and 90th percentile.
Table 2.2 also shows that the counties in my sample exhibit a wide range of real
median wages, with 90 percent of them falling between $12.77 and $24.59, although
much of this variation is due to rising real median wages. My key results concern
the restaurant sector — with a mean private-sector employment share of about nine
percent, restaurants are on average a substantial source of employment in the border
county sample.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Primary estimates
Before turning to my primary results, I first demonstrate that minimum wage
effects differ for low-median wage and high-median wage areas. I divide the sample
into high median wage county pairs and low median wage county pairs. For each
quantile of the split sample, Figure 2.3 shows the probability density of the own-county
minimum-to-median wage ratio exp(wmit −w50it ). Dividing the sample along these lines
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works as intended: counties whose median wage is generally high have, on average,
much lower Kaitz indices. For overall, high-, and low-median wage counties, I regress
the linear specification
Yit = βwmit + ΛXit + ρi + τpt + it.
The first row of Table 2.3 reports minimum wage elasticities β of earnings and
employment for the overall (not split) sample. Standard errors are clustered on both
the state-level and state border segment-level to account for serial correlation in the
minimum and the fact that a given county can be in multiple pairs along state borders.
Minimum wage increases clearly affect average restaurant earnings, with a statistically
significant elasticity of 0.186. The elasticity of employment is statistically insignificant
and only -0.057. In the second row of the table, high median wage counties — those
with lower Kaitz indices – see only a small increase in earnings, as expected for the
minimum wage is generally less binding in these county pairs. The employment effects
also appear small in high median wage county pairs. There, the minimum wage
elasticity is very close to zero. For pairs with low median wages on average, both
earnings effects and employment effects are much larger in magnitude. Low median
wage pairs have a statistically significant elasticity of earnings of 0.333 and also see a
statistically significant fall in employment in response to a minimum wage increase,
with an elasticity of -0.169. These employment and earnings differences between low
and high median wage county pairs are sizable, statistically different at the five percent
level, and suggest that areas with lower median wages may be more susceptible to
disemployment effects of the minimum wage.
I next present the main set of results using the primary specification
Yit = β1(wmit − w50it ) + β2(wmit − w50it )2 + ΛXit + ρi + τpt + it
which is quadratic in the log minimum-to-median ratio. Table 2.4 reports earnings
and employment elasticities for both OLS, reduced form, and 2SLS estimates of this
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equation. As described earlier, I report elasticities β1 + 2β2(wm − w50) evaluated
at three levels of the Kaitz index, representing the 10th percentile, mean, and 90th
percentile of my sample: 0.32, 0.42, and 0.52.
Beginning with earnings elasticities, OLS estimates of the structural equation show
a null elasticity at the low Kaitz value, but modest and larger earnings elasticities for
areas with more binding minimum wages. Nevertheless, the OLS earnings elasticities
seem low in general: for a Kaitz of 0.52 the statistically significant estimated elasticity of
0.157 is not far above the elasticity of 0.135 for high median wage county pairs reported
in Table 2.3. Because about one-fifth of restaurant workers earn the minimum or
below, we would expect an average wage treatment elasticity of about 0.200. Reduced
form estimates show higher earnings impacts in general and greater curvature in the
response along the minimum-to-median wage ratio. Across the two instrument sets
Z1 and Z2, minimum wages tend have very little or moderate earnings effect at low
values of the Kaitz, but much sharper and statistically positive effects at Kaitz indices
of 0.42 and 0.52. 2SLS estimates follow the same pattern. In all of the reduced form
and 2SLS estimates, earnings elasticities at low Kaitz indices (0.32) are statistically
different at the one percent level from earnings elasticities at high Kaitz indices (0.52).
These observations strengthen the general plausibility of my results and empirical
approach: where the minimum wage cuts more deeply into the wage distribution, the
earnings-increasing impacts of the minimum wage are greater, as expected.
Turning to employment, for greater minimum-to-median wage ratios, OLS point
estimates of employment elasticities move from more negative to more positive as the
minimum becomes more binding. The reduced form estimates reverse this pattern.
All point estimates are imprecise, and I cannot rule out other patterns, as compared
to the unambiguous pattern in earnings elasticities. Both sets of 2SLS estimates
suggest a modest increase in the disemployment effects. For example, the 2SLS results
in specification 2, using own-county-based instruments, show that the employment
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elasticity is -0.027 at the low value of the Kaitz but becomes more negative, -0.110, at
a high Kaitz index of 0.52. Unsurprisingly, given the lack of statistical precision in the
reduced form estimates, the 2SLS estimates are too imprecise to state with statistical
confidence that disemployment effects grow in this way. Although differences between
employment elasticities at low- and high-Kaitz values are always nominally greater
than 0.05, the differences are never statistically significant at conventional levels. In
the third instrument set, for example, the difference between low and high elasticities
is -0.083, with a 95% confidence interval of (-0.328, 0.160).
First stage F-statistics suggest that some caution is warranted in accepting the
validity of the 2SLS estimates for county-pair-based instrument sets 1. Angrist-
Pischke F-statistics for the linear wmit − w50it and quadratic (wmit − w50it )2 outcomes
for this instrument set are 8.2 and 5.2, one of which is less than Stock-Yogo (2005)
critical value of 7.03 for 10% maximal size distortion, but less than the 4.58 value for
15% maximal size distortion. In terms of first-stage precision, the best performing
instrument is the own-county mean-based instrument set Z3, with first stage F-statistics
exceeding 135 and 164. On the other hand, while having a strong first stage, the
exclusion restriction for the own-county-based instrument is not as straightforward as
with the first two sets of county-pair-based instruments.
Because I do not have an unambiguous preference between these sets of instruments,
I also continue to present results using all sets of instruments. I also explore in Table 2.5
IV specifications that use all four instruments. This table repeats in columns labeled
(3) the 2SLS estimates and LIML estimates using Z1, and their squares to instrument
the two endogenous variables. 2SLS and LIML results are nearly identical. Up to
two decimal places, the LIML results are the same as the own-county median-based
instrument set Z2, Z22 .
For the IV estimates, Table 2.6 shows estimates of the labor demand elasticity,
or ratio of the employment to earnings elasticities, at various minimum-to-median
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wage ratios. The labor demand elasticity gauges the strength of these estimated
effects by formally examining where employment losses may outweigh earnings gains.
I estimate the demand elasticity using a fully interacted model of stacked employment
and earnings outcomes and conduct inference using Stata’s nlcom command, which
uses the delta method. Here, as throughout the rest of the paper, I report estimates
for instrument sets 1 and 2, as well as the LIML results using all instruments. One
striking result in Table 2.6 is that most of the labor demand elasticities hover around or
just above -0.3 in magnitude. For example, labor demand elasticities at a minimum-to-
median wage ratio of 0.52 range from -0.290 to -0.343. At this minimum-to-median wage
ratio and with a 95% degree of confidence, no labor demand elasticity is statistically
more negative than -0.63. At a ratio of 0.32, the range of labor demand elasticities is
-0.240 to -0.330, although the estimates are somewhat less precise.
Figure 2.4 graphically illustrates all the IV elasticities at the 5th through 95th
percentiles of the minimum-to-median wage ratios in my primary sample, ranging
roughly from about 0.28 to 0.55. For the relevant sample of minimum-to-median
wage ratios, my estimates for both earnings and employment elasticities are relatively
linear in the Kaitz index. Because of the strong increase in restaurant earnings
elasticities and the relatively modest decrease in employment elasticities, I estimate
that earnings effects exceed the absolute value of employment effects for much of
the the minimum-to-median wage distribution. In particular, for almost all Kaitz
indices, the labor demand elasticity is, at the five percent level, very clearly less than
-1 in magnitude. For a potential employment-earnings tradeoff involved in raising the
minimum wage, these pictures suggest that there is a net benefit due to increased
earnings. In addition, the relatively precise labor demand elasticity estimates will be
useful for future evaluations of potential minimum wage increases.
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2.6.2 Falsification and robustness
I use four sets strategies to assess the internal validity and robustness of these
results. First, I show that the first two instrument sets appear to be independent of
unobserved shocks that affect median wages: adding the median wage as an additional
control does not affect the reduced form estimates. Second I examine how well each
instrument set performs in predicting spurious employment and earnings outcomes in
the overall private sector and the construction sector, both of which have only a small
subset of workers earning the minimum wage. Third, using the split sample of high-
and low-median wage county pairs, I show that each of the quantiles passes a leaded
effects falsification test. I additionally show a leaded effects falsification test using
the full sample; instrument sets using own-county median wages do not pass this test.
Finally I show the pattern of IV results changes little when using alternative sets of
controls and county sample definitions.
As an indirect check that the IV strategy isolates exogenous variation in the
Kaitz index, I examine how adding the log median wage to the control set affects
the OLS and reduced form results. Figure 2.5 shows OLS and the first two sets
of reduced form elasticities with and without the median wage control, at the 5th
through 95th percentiles minimum-to-median wage ratio. OLS results, especially for
earnings, shift somewhat after adding this control, consistent with unobserved demand
shocks affecting the median are contaminating the causal interpretation of the OLS
parameter estimates. In contrast, adding median wages to the reduced form equations
have almost no effect on the point estimates for any of the three instrument sets,
increasing confidence in the success of the IV strategy.
As one set of falsification tests, I use the primary specification to estimate minimum
wage elasticities of employment and earnings on two sectors with few minimum wage
workers: the overall private sector and the construction industry. In 2012, only about
5.1 percent of the overall private sector earned at or below the minimum wage. At
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0.7 percent, the construction industry in 2012 had the lowest share of minimum wage
workers among all major industries.11 To estimate these effects, I use the primary
specification described above, but when estimating overall private sector effects, I
drop overall private employment as a control. Figure 2.6 presents the OLS and 2SLS
point estimates of earnings and employment elasticities for the restaurnt, overall
private sector, and construction industries at the 5th through 95th percentiles of
the minimum-to-median wage ratio in my sample. I find that OLS results perform
very poorly, estimating relatively large negative employment effects for the private
sector at low values of the Kaitz index, and sizable disemployment effects in the
construction industry for high values of the Kaitz index. In contrast, I find that the
2SLS specifications perform somewhat better on these falsficiation tests with much
lower estimated elasticities for both the entire private sector and the construction
industry. For all instrument sets, the estimated employment effects are almost always
smaller than 0.05 in magnitude.
The falsification results for the construction industry contrast markedly with the
likely spurious effects detected by Meer and West (2013), a study of the average
treatment effect of the minimum on employment growth. Whereas even at a minimum-
to-median ratio of about 0.55, my worst- and best-performing specifications estimate
construction industry elasticities range from roughly -0.06 to -0.03, the preceding
authors find an implied employment elasticity for the construction industry of about
-0.26 five years after a minimum wage increase.12
11See Table 5 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics Characteristics of Minimum Wage Workers: 2012,
available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/minwage2012tbls.htm.
12Meer and West (2013) find the construction industry employment growth rate semi-elasticity
with respect to the minimum is -0.0296, an estimate that is statistically significant at the 1 percent
level (see their Table 2). To convert their estimate to an employment level elasticity, I use the authors’
preferred extrapolation method (see their pp. 19-20), which assumes that a 10 percent minimum
wage increase fully erodes after five years, and their data sample’s mean employment level and job
growth rate for the construction industry.
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I also administer a falsification test of leaded effects to examine the identification
assumptions for high and low-median wage areas. I first use a simple test of leaded
effects within county pairs; this speaks primarily to the validity of the exclusion
restriction for instrument set 1. Splitting the sample as before into high- and low-
median wage county pairs, I add a four-quarter lead of the log minimum wage so that
the equation being estimated in each split sample is
Yit = βwmit + γwmit+1 + ΛXit + ρi + τpt + it.
A small coefficient for γ indicates within high- and low-median wage county pairs,
contiguous counties have similar counterfactual earnings and employment trends. For
reference, the first column of Table 2.7 presents earnings elasticities from a specification
excluding the leaded term, and the second column includes the four-quarter lead
minimum wage term. The third and fourth columns repeat these specifications for
employment outcomes. Estimates of leaded elasticities are very small and statistically
insignificant. In addition, contemporaneous earnings and employment elasticities are
similar with and without the lead term, suggesting that minimum wage elasticities
within high- and low-median wage county pairs are not picking up any spurious
pre-trends.
As a second leaded effects falsification test, I use the four-quarter lead model
Yit = β1(wmit−w50it )+β2(wmit−w50it )2+γ1(wmit+1−w50it+1)+γ2(wmit+1−w50it+1)2+ΛXit+ρi+τpt+it
on the full sample, so that there are four endogenous variables. I instrument them
with contemporaneous and leaded values of the instrument sets Z1 and Z2, separately.
I also report estimates using LIML with all eight instruments. Table 2.8 shows the
estimates across instrument sets for both contemporaneous and leaded marginal effects,
calculated as β1 + 2β2(wm − w50) and γ1 + 2γ2(wm − w50), respectively. In general
I find that all instrument sets pass the leaded effects falsification test for earnings,
but instrument sets 2 and 3 fail for employment. At a Kaitz of 0.52, the four-quarter
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leaded marginal effect for county-pair-based instrument set 1 is only 0.046, but the
value rises sharply to about -0.14 for both instrument sets 2 and 3. These spurious
effects for instrument sets 2 and 3 suggest that employment is either low or falling
one year prior to the minimum wage increase. Because of this failure, in future work I
will explore additional instrument sets in order to determine an instrumental variable
strategies that has both a strong first stage and passes the leaded effects falsification
test.
To determine how robust the IV results are to alternative controls and sample
definitions, I first consider two modifications. First, I exclude log overall employment
and teen population shares as controls in my regression specification. Second, I drop
the county pair distance requirement of 75 miles, thereby allowing all contiguous county
pairs in the sample, including large counties with distant population centroids. Table
2.9 presents estimates from these modifications. Specifications 1 in this table repeat
the primary sample’s elasticities, and specifications 2 and 3 drop control variables
and distance requirements, respectively.. In general, estimates are relatively stable
for earnings elasticities across these modifications, but marginally smaller at the high
end of the Kaitz index for the specification that drops the distance requirement. For
employment, dropping the control variables flattens the curvature of the elasticities
somewhat, but again the results remain relatively imprecise. For instrument sets 2
and 3, dropping the distance requirement sharpens the curvature of the employment
elasticity estimates, with elasticities very close to 0.01 or zero at low values of the
Kaitz index, but with employment elasticities more negative than -0.150 at high values
of the Kaitz index. These differences are nonetheless not statistically different from
each other.
Finally, I examine how 2SLS elasticities change when dropping all interpolated
years, as well as dropping data before 2000. Table 2.10 reports that in general these
modifications have little effect on the tenor of my results, except when considering
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results with both exclusions. In this case, employment effects are flattened substantially
and hover around -0.8 to -0.11 across all specifications. Although my results seem
somewhat sensitive to this sample choice, this particular exclusion of 1990 and all
interpolated years eliminates more than 50 percent of my sample.
2.6.3 Sensitivity to functional form
I use two strategies to assess how sensitive my results are to alternative functional
forms. First, I estimate a slightly different structural equation and, accordingly, use
an alternative set of instruments. Instead of estimating the primary specification, an
equation quadratic in the log Kaitz index, I modify the standard linear equation
Yit = βwmit + ΛXit + ρi + τt + it
to include a linear interaction term of the minimum wage and the log Kaitz index:
Yit = β1wmit + β2wmit (wmit − w50it ) + ΛXit + ρi + τt + it. (2.8)
This equation also allows the minimum wage elasticity to vary by the bindingness of
the minimum wage. To ensure that I make similar comparisons of marginal effects
between the linear interaction specification and my primary quadratic specifcation, I
modify the interactive term in equation 2.8 to be
Yit = β1wmit + β2wmit (
1
2w
m
it − w50it ) + ΛXit + ρi + τt + it
so that the elasticity with respect to the minimum wage is again β1 + β2(wm − w50).
To estimate this elasticity, I again use an instrumental variables approach, this time
instrumenting only the linear interaction term with wmit (12w
m
it − w50), where w50 is
either the county pair-time-specific mean w50pt , county pair mean w50p , or own-county
mean w50i , similar to before.
Table 2.11 shows the resulting 2SLS estimates. The left panel repeats results using
the primary log Kaitz quadratic specification, and the right panel shows results from the
new, linear interaction specification. Restaurant earnings elasticities continue to show
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the same pattern of increasing elasticities in more minimum-wage binding counties.
Estimates for all instrument sets become somewhat less precise. For all instrument
sets, employment elasticities see marginally sharper curvature — with attenuating
employment effects or nominally greater disemployment effects, depending on the
specification — but the point estimates from these linear interaction specifications are
very imprecise. Although there are no gains for precision from using this alternative
functional form, the similar point estimates provide some confidence that functional
form choices are not critical components of my results.
To assess if the curvature I estimate using the quadratic or linear interaction
specifications is simply an artifact of these spcific parameterizations, I also estimate
the reduced form equation using a restricted cubic spline function. The spline approach
allows a somewhat more flexible form for any nonlinear effects, and also permits
the simple construction of confidence intervals. I use four knots at equally spaced
percentiles of the minimum-to-median wage distribution (20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th
percentiles), and calculate marginal effect of the minimum. I do not explore other,
more flexible partial linear models because the large number of more than 35,000 fixed
effects in my model makes estimation computationally intensive; these fixed effects
cannot be mean-differenced as nuisance parameters with such estimators, as they can
in a linear fixed effects model.
Figure 2.7 shows the resulting earnings elasticities, employment elasticities, and the
sum of these elasticities for the 5th through 95th percentiles of the minimum-to-median
wage ratio distribution. The reduced-form earnings elasticities are very similar across
specifications, with point estimates that are increasing throughout the 0.35 to 0.50
range of minimum-to-median wage ratios. For employment, the shape of the reduced
form employment elasticities varies somewhat across instrument sets. Although wide
standard errors prevent saying anything with great statistical confidence, there is a
small U-shaped pattern for the county-pair-time-specific instrument set and the second
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sets present somewhat different indications of where negative employment effects begin
to grow more rapidly in magnitude. For the specification with own-county-based
instruments, however, employment effects appear to fit the pattern described by the
primary 2SLS results: employment effects are negligible at very low values of the
minimum-to-median wage ratio but become more negative for minimum-to-median
wage ratios above 0.40. I interpret the restricted cubic spline results as providing
suggestive evidence that my primary quadratic specification does not force the data
into presenting a misleading picture of minimum wage effects for restaurants.
2.7 Discussion
Incorporating the relative location of the minimum into studies of minimum
wage effects has foundations in economic theory and also provides a natural point of
reference for policy discussions. In particular, bindingness as the nonlinear treatment
variable allows elasticities to be calculated for areas with specific minimum-to-median
wage ratios. The resulting elasticity estimates are therefore useful for policy-makers
considering local area minimum wage increases.
In particular I find that while there is some evidence that restaurant disemployment
effects of the minimum grow stronger or “kick in” at high levels of minimum-to-
median wage ratios, the disemployment effects are outweighed by large, positive
increases in restaurant worker earnings. In my preferred specification, restaurant
employment elasticities approach -0.1 at high minimum-to-median ratios, but none
of the employment elasticities for the full sample are statistically significant. In
contrast, restaurant earnings elasticities grow significantly as the minimum covers
more of the wage distribution, with elasticities ranging from about 0.105 to 0.110 at
minimum-to-median wage ratios of 0.32, to 0.322 to 0.331 at a Kaitz index of 0.52.
At minimum-to-median wage ratios between 0.32 and 0.52, I find strong evidence
of relatively constant labor demand elasticities. Between these two Kaitz indices, labor
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demand elasticity estimates range from -0.242 to -0.343, depending on the specification.
For most of the range of minimum-to-median wage ratios in my sample, the labor
demand elasticity estimates are statistically smaller in magnitude than -1, implying
that the minimum wage increases restaurant worker earnings on average. In addition,
even at minimum-to-median wage ratios of 0.55, labor demand elasticities are never
more statistically negative than -0.64, at the five percent level.
These relatively precise bounds on labor demand elasticities are useful for evaluating
minimum wage policies across areas of various latent wage levels. As a rough example,
consider the states of Maryland and Mississippi. Both currently obey the federal
minimum wage of $7.25, but due to higher wages in Maryland and lower wages in
Mississippi, the minimum-to-median wage ratios in these states were about 0.32 and
0.47, respectively. Suppose both face a minimum wage raise to $10.10, about a 0.33
log increase. If about 20 percent of restaurant workers in each state earn the minimum
wage, we would expect based on the labor demand elasticities in Table 2.6 that
restaurant employment in Maryland would fall by 1.6 to 2.2 percent, and 1.9 percent
to 2.2 percent in Mississippi as well. However, if in lower wage Mississippi, 25 percent
of restaurant workers earn less than the minimum, its employment fall would range
from 2.4 percent to 2.8 percent.
Because some IV specifications have relatively weak first stages and others with
stronger first stages fail a leaded effects falsfication test, future work will explore
additional instrument sets. Increasing the data sample beyond border counties may
also be salutary, both because of the lack of precision in some of the employment
elasticity estimates and also because of the concern that minimum wage responses in
border counties may not be representative of most areas in the US. One possibility is
to extend the instrumental variable strategy in this paper to state-level data, where
median wages are available for more than three decades using the Current Population
Survey. Of course state-level research poses its own set of research design problems, as
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some of the most credible research designs for state-level panel studies of the minimum
wage rely on both border discontinuties and linear parameterizations of state-specific
trends (Allegretto, Dube, Reich and Zipperer 2013a, Dube 2013). Not relying on
such functional form assumptions, the border discontinuity research design remains
more attractive. At the same time, the long panel of state-level data may provide
a rich source of variation in the minimum-to-median wage ratio relevant to regional
policy-makers in the US, who often contemplate state-level changes in minimum wage
laws. State-level research designs may also involve fewer right-hand-side variables, a
matter of practical computational importance for pursuing more flexible nonlinear
estimators of minimum wage effects.
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Table 2.1. Hypothetical minimum wage increase
Time 1 Time 2 Percent changein minimum
Area A
Minimum wage 4 5 25.0%
Median wage 10 10
Minimum-to-median wage ratio 0.40 0.50
Area B
Minimum wage 5 7 40.0%
Median wage 20 20
Minimum-to-median wage ratio 0.25 0.35
Table 2.2. Distribution of key variables in the border county sample
5th perc. 10th perc. Mean 90th perc. 95th perc.
Minimum-to-median wage ratio 0.284 0.314 0.422 0.519 0.543
Real median wage (2012$) 12.77 13.32 16.97 22.46 24.59
Real minimum wage (2012$) 5.98 6.20 6.94 7.74 8.27
Restaurant employment share 0.050 0.056 0.087 0.123 0.142
Teen population share 0.057 0.060 0.071 0.082 0.089
Note: The border county sample consists of county-level observations for all cross-state-border
county pairs with nonmissing data during 1990-2012. Restaurant employment share is ratio of
restaurant-to-overall private sector employment. Teen population share is the ratio of teen-to-
overall population.
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Table 2.3. Employment and earnings elasticities with respect to the minimum wage,
for high- and low-median wage county pairs
Earnings Employment
All pairs 0.186*** –0.057
(0.039) (0.059)
69,920 69,920
High median wage pairs 0.135*** –0.010
(0.036) (0.073)
34,960 34,960
Low median wage pairs 0.333*** –0.169**
(0.076) (0.079)
34,960 34,960
Note: High- and low-median wage county pairs are those county pairs with mean county
pair median wages above and below the sample median, respectively. Elasticity is the
coefficient on the logarithm of the minimum wage. Robust standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the state and border segment levels. Significance levels are denoted by *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.4. Restaurant employment and earnings elasticities, by minimum-to-median
wage ratios
OLS Reduced form 2SLS
Earnings (1) (2) (1) (2)
Kaitz = 0.32 0.061** 0.053*** 0.121*** 0.105*** 0.110***
(0.027) (0.019) (0.028) (0.025) (0.027)
Kaitz = 0.42 0.114*** 0.170*** 0.216*** 0.232*** 0.229***
(0.029) (0.035) (0.042) (0.046) (0.045)
Kaitz = 0.52 0.157*** 0.262*** 0.290*** 0.331*** 0.322***
(0.043) (0.060) (0.065) (0.075) (0.075)
Employment (1) (2) (1) (2)
Kaitz = 0.32 –0.036 –0.018 –0.030 –0.035 –0.027
(0.049) (0.023) (0.063) (0.041) (0.063)
Kaitz = 0.42 0.008 –0.051 –0.069 –0.069 –0.074
(0.054) (0.059) (0.067) (0.081) (0.072)
Kaitz = 0.52 0.042 –0.076 –0.099 –0.096 –0.110
(0.075) (0.101) (0.099) (0.132) (0.113)
Instruments
County pair X time Y Y
County mean Y Y
AP F - linear 8.245 135.736
AP F - quadratic 5.187 164.211
Note: Elasticities are the marginal effect of the minimum at the specified
minimum-to-median wage ratio. The sample size for all specifications is
69,920. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state and
border segment levels. Significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.1, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.5. IV estimates of restaurant employment and earnings elasticities, by
minimum-to-median wage ratios
2SLS LIML
Earnings (1) (2) (3) (3)
Kaitz = 0.32 0.105*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.110***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Kaitz = 0.42 0.232*** 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.229***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Kaitz = 0.52 0.331*** 0.322*** 0.323*** 0.323***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074)
Employment (1) (2) (3) (3)
Kaitz = 0.32 –0.035 –0.027 –0.028 –0.028
(0.041) (0.063) (0.059) (0.059)
Kaitz = 0.42 –0.069 –0.074 –0.073 –0.073
(0.081) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073)
Kaitz = 0.52 –0.096 –0.110 –0.108 –0.108
(0.132) (0.113) (0.114) (0.114)
Instruments
County pair X time Y Y Y
County mean Y Y Y
AP F - linear 8.245 135.736 50.889 50.889
AP F - quadratic 5.187 164.211 72.050 72.050
Note: Elasticities are the marginal effect of the minimum at the specified
minimum-to-median wage ratio. The sample size for all specifications is
69,520. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state and
border segment levels. Significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.1, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.6. IV estimates of restaurant labor demand elasticities, by minimum-to-
median wage ratios
2SLS LIML
Labor demand elasticity (1) (2) (3)
Kaitz = 0.28 –0.412 –0.071 –0.118
(1.635) (2.591) (2.253)
Kaitz = 0.32 –0.330** –0.242 –0.255
(0.161) (0.344) (0.301)
Kaitz = 0.37 –0.307*** –0.298** –0.299**
(0.109) (0.123) (0.122)
Kaitz = 0.42 –0.298** –0.322*** –0.317***
(0.130) (0.108) (0.111)
Kaitz = 0.47 –0.293* –0.335*** –0.327***
(0.151) (0.119) (0.121)
Kaitz = 0.52 –0.290* –0.343** –0.333**
(0.168) (0.134) (0.134)
Kaitz = 0.55 –0.289 –0.347** –0.336**
(0.176) (0.143) (0.141)
Instruments
County pair X time Y Y
County mean Y Y
Note: Elasticities are the ratio of the employment and earnings
marginal effects of the minimum at the specified minimum-to-
median wage ratio. The sample size for all specifications is 69,520.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state
and border segment levels. Significance levels are denoted by * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.7. Contemporaneous and leaded elasticities for the split sample
Earnings Employment
All pairs (1) (2) (1) (2)
Current minimum 0.186*** 0.186*** –0.057 –0.050
(0.039) (0.037) (0.059) (0.047)
Four quarter lead 0.000 –0.011
(0.030) (0.052)
High median wage pairs
Current minimum 0.135*** 0.112*** –0.010 –0.001
(0.036) (0.033) (0.073) (0.046)
Four quarter lead 0.032 –0.012
(0.032) (0.052)
Low median wage pairs
Current minimum 0.333*** 0.346*** –0.169** –0.156*
(0.076) (0.059) (0.079) (0.089)
Four quarter lead –0.023 –0.024
(0.054) (0.090)
Note: High- and low-median wage county pairs are those county pairs with mean county
pair median wages above and below the sample median, respectively. Specifications
labeled (1) only include the contemporanous minimum wage; specifications labeled
(2) also include the four-quarter lead minimum wage. Elasticities are the coefficient
on the logarithm of the contemporaneous or leaded minimum wage. Robust standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the state and border segment levels. Significance
levels are denoted by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.11. Restaurant employment and earnings elasticities: IV estimates using
alternative functional forms
Primary specification Interactive specification
Earnings (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Kaitz = 0.32 0.105*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.082** 0.091*** 0.091***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Kaitz = 0.42 0.232*** 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.239*** 0.234*** 0.234***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.056) (0.054) (0.054)
Kaitz = 0.52 0.331*** 0.322*** 0.323*** 0.363*** 0.347*** 0.347***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.103) (0.100) (0.100)
Employment (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Kaitz = 0.32 –0.035 –0.027 –0.028 –0.028 –0.018 –0.018
(0.041) (0.063) (0.059) (0.047) (0.077) (0.077)
Kaitz = 0.42 –0.069 –0.074 –0.073 –0.071 –0.076 –0.076
(0.081) (0.072) (0.073) (0.086) (0.076) (0.076)
Kaitz = 0.52 –0.096 –0.110 –0.108 –0.104 –0.122 –0.122
(0.132) (0.113) (0.114) (0.155) (0.132) (0.132)
Instruments
County pair X time Y Y Y Y
County mean Y Y Y Y
Estimator 2SLS 2SLS LIML 2SLS 2SLS LIML
AP F - linear 8.245 135.736 50.889
AP F - quadratic 5.187 164.211 72.050
F - interaction 10.930 23.705 13.331
Note: Elasticities are the marginal effect of the minimum at the specified minimum-to-
median wage ratio. The sample size for all specifications is 69,920. Robust standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the state and border segment levels. Significance
levels are denoted by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 2.1. Minimum wages, median wages, and their ratio for the entire United
States and for the border county sample
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Notes: The border county sample consists of county-level observations for all cross-state-border
county pairs with nonmissing data during 1990-2012.
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Figure 2.2. High and low county-level means of minimum wages, median wages, and
minimum-to-median wage ratios, for the primary border county sample
Real minimum wages (2012$)
Above median (6.78)
Below median (6.78)
Not in the primary border county sample
Real median wage (2012$)
Above median (15.73)
Below median (15.73)
Not in the primary border county sample
Minimum-to-median wage ratios
Above median (0.440)
Below median (0.440)
Not in the primary border county sample
Notes: The figure display whether each county-level mean of the minimum wage, median wage, or
minimum-to-median wage ratio is above or below the respective median value across counties in the
primary border county regression sample for restaurant employment.
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Figure 2.3. Density of the county-level minimum-to-median wage ratio, by county-
pair median wages
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Notes: For county pairs whose mean median wage is above or below the border county sample
median, the figure shows the probability density function of county-level minimum-to-median wage
ratios.
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Figure 2.4. Restaurant employment and earnings elasticities and their sum, using
2SLS
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Notes: Restaurant earnings and employment elasticities are calculated using 2SLS estimates of the
primary specification, separately for three instruments sets, as indicated. The shaded 95% confidence
intervals use robust standard errors clustered at the state and border segment levels.
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Figure 2.5. OLS and reduced form earnings and employment elasticities, with and
without median income controls
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Notes: In green (blue) are point estimates of earnings (employment) elasticities with respect to the
minimum wage at the 5th through 95th percentiles of the minimum-to-median wage ratio of the
primary sample. Solid lines are the primary specification described in the text. Dashed lines are the
primary specifications with the log median and squared log median as additional controls.
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Figure 2.7. Reduced-form restaurant employment and earnings elasticities and their
sum, using restricted cubic splines
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Notes: Reduced-form elasticities calculated using restricted cubic splines, shown for the 5th through
95th percentiles of the minimum-to-median wage ratio in the primary sample. The cubic splines have
four knots at the 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th percentiles of the minimum-to-median wage. The shaded
95% confidence intervals use robust standard errors clustered at the state and border segment levels.
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CHAPTER 3
MINIMUM WAGES AND PUBLIC BENEFIT PROGRAM
RECEIPT
3.1 Introduction
Through a patchwork of public benefit programs, the US government subsidizes
low-wage employers by supplementing the earnings of their employees. Whereas one
quarter of all workers live in families receiving public benefits, for employees of the
low-paying fast-food industry, as an example, this share doubles to more than half
Allegretto et al. (2013b). The difference in benefit receipt is not due to work hours
but simply because the median nonmanagerial fast-food worker earned within 20% of
the federal minimum wage. Raising the minimum wage floor can in principle compel
employers to pay enough so that their workers’ families rely less on governmental
assistance to make ends meet.
As a consequence, the minimum wage may reduce fiscal burdens, shifting the costs
of compensating workers in low-wage industries from the government to employers
and their customers. Replacing government subsidies with higher pre-tax earnings
can interest those who claim they “don’t want a dependency culture,” contrasting
that idea with the appeal of a “culture of work.”1 There are also important efficiency
considerations: the total resource cost of raising pre-tax earnings may be lower than
raising post-tax benefits. A large body of evidence, reviewed in Hendren (2013), argues
that tax and transfer policies incur large costs as a result of behavioral responses. In
1See, for example, Paul Ryan both on MSNBC, January 26, 2013, and also on “Morning in
America” radio, March 12, 2014.
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particular, Saez et al. (2012) calculated that for a tax increase focused on the top
one percent of earners, the marginal excess burden of an extra dollar of federal tax
revenue is almost 34 cents.
Using seven regression specifications, I estimate the effects of the minimum wage on
participation in six major public benefit programs: food stamps, school lunch subsidies,
Medicaid, EITC, housing subsidies, and heating assistance. In general I find evidence
that minimum wage increases reduce participation in some of these benefits programs,
with the clearest evidence for the food stamps program. I find uniform evidence across
specifications that increases in the minimum wage strongly reduce participation in
food stamps programs: in my preferred specification, the elasticity of food stamps
receipt with respect to the minimum is -0.39, with a 95 percent confidence interval
of (-0.57, -0.22). Effects on school lunch subsidy and Medicaid participation range
from near zero to statistically significant elasticities of -0.11 and -0.16, respectively,
depending on the exact specification. I also estimate minimum wage effects on Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) participation, although these results should be interpreted
as EITC eligibility effects because the survey data estimate participation rather than
ask respondents directly. For the EITC, I estimate an elasticity of near zero, 0.03,
with a 95% confidence interval of (-0.09, 0.15). For housing subsidies and heating
assistance, none of the candidate models passes falsification tests for leaded effects.
Any deleterious employment effects of raising minimum wage may automatically
increase reliance on counter-cyclical social assistance programs. “Every time the
minimum wage goes up,” US Congressman Mac Thornberry argued, “more and more
people lose their jobs... You’re putting them off to government dependency, perhaps
for the rest of their lives.”2 Indeed, the fact that public program benefits compensate
minimum-wage induced unemployment led Leffler (1978) to conjecture that these
2http://www.newschannel6now.com/story/24759544/minimum-wage-debate
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welfare programs are themselves major reasons why low-income families support the
minimum wage. The findings in this paper are inconsistent with both hypotheses, as
I do not find evidence that minimum wages increase the total number of those on
governmental support programs by exacerbating unemployment or poverty.
My results are however consistent with recent empirical literature showing that
minimum wages in the US appear to lead to sizable increases in earnings and small
effects on employment, using a variety of empirical methods (see the review in Allegretto
et al. 2013a). Recent work also indicates that the minimum wage raises family incomes
and reduces the incidence of poverty. Dube (2013) surveys a dozen recent studies
and concludes that “nearly all (48) of the 54 estimates of the poverty rate elasticity
are negative in sign.” Updating this work with a larger sample and controls for time-
varying spatial heterogeneity, Dube (2013) calculates poverty rate elasticities ranging
from -0.12 to -0.37, with most of these estimates being statistically significant at
conventional levels. In particular, this recent work finds that minimum wages improve
overall incomes for those families closest to poverty line thresholds. Because most social
assistance programs in the US are mean-tested, with eligibility cutoffs tied income
limits near family poverty thresholds, these results suggest that government-imposed
wage floors may in fact reduce the roles of public benefit recipients.
There is little previous work estimating minimum wage effects on benefit programs.
In a concurrent but independently researched study, West and Reich (2014) found that
the minimum generates sizable reductions in food stamp receipt. Using individual-
level March Current Population Survey (CPS) data on receipt and state-level data on
receipt and expenditures, West and Reich (2014) estimated a food stamp enrollment
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elasticity of about -0.46 and a food stamps expenditure elasticity of -0.19.3 I also use
March CPS microdata but expand the analysis to include additional benefit programs.
With individual-level Survey on Income and Program Participation data Sabia
and Nielsen (2013) found of elasticities of food stamp receipt ranging from -0.29 to
-0.93, but none of these estimates was statistically significant. Two simulation studies,
Zabin, Dube, and Jacobs (2004) and Neumark et al. (2012), estimated that higher
minimum-wage and living-wage laws would reduce expenditures and the receipt of
public assistance. Neumark and Wascher (2011) investigate the employment and
earnings effects of EITC eligibility and minimum wages, but they do not estimate
direct effects of the minimum on EITC transfers or receipt.
In contrast to the general direction of results from these studies and my findings,
Page, Spetz and Millar (2005) estimate that higher minimum wages increase the
number of recipients of welfare, a program once known as Aid to Families with
Dependent Children and now called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. The
authors, however, acknowledge that their results are “sensitive to the sample period
and assumptions about state trends.” For instance, their baseline elasticity of welfare
receipt falls by more than half from 0.184 to 0.083 when incorporating controls for
state-specific business cycles by interacting state fixed effects with state unemployment
rates. I do not estimate the effect of the minimum on welfare rolls because the
existing program in the US covers so few receipients: in 2012, about 2.3 percent of
the nonelderly population participated.
In Section 3.2, I identify six major benefit programs and their eligiblity guidelines.
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 describe my methods and present my results, and Section 3.5
concludes.
3West and Reich (2014) report in Table 1 the food stamp enrollment semielasticity of -0.042
and note on p.10 that 9.1 percent of their March CPS sample received food stamps. I calculate the
enrollment elasticity as the ratio of these numbers.
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3.2 Benefit program descriptions
For this study I consider six major means-tested benefit programs in the US –
food stamps, school lunch subsidies, Medicaid, EITC, housing subsidies, and heating
assistance – for which consistent data are available in the March Current Population
Survey since 1990. Eligibility for all of these programs except housind subsidies is
explicitly tied to multiples of federal poverty guidelines, family-size-specific income
limits that are updated annually. In 2014, the federal poverty level for a family of
three is $19,790.4 Historically, the limits for a family of three were defined in 1963-1964
by multiplying by three the cost of the US Agriculture Department’s “economy food
plan,” with modifications for other family sizes. Since that time period, poverty limits
have only been adjusted by price changes using the Consumer Price Index.5 Although
these guidelines officially delineate families above and below a definition of poverty
and are used as eligibility thresholds for a variety of social assistance programs, it is
widely recognized that these income limits are vastly lower than incomes required to
ensure access to basic needs (Bernstein, Boushey, and Brocht 2001).
The federal food stamps program, now officially known as the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), provides monthly benefits for food purchases
to families whose gross monthly income falls below 130% of the poverty line, or about
$25,727 on an annual basis for a family of three in 2014. After housing costs and
child care are deducted, family monthly net income must also fall below 100 percent
of the poverty line. In addition, families families face an asset limit of $2,000-$3,250,
depending on whether the household includes elderly or disabled members. States
have some leeway in modifying these eligibility limits, particularly the calculation
of asset values, but largely conform to federal standards. One recent exception is
Connecticut, which in 2009, expanded food stamps eligibility to households up to 185%
4See http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/14poverty.cfm.
5http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/faq.cfm
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of the poverty line. Food stamp benefits depend on the food stamp unit’s distance
from the income threshold. While the maximum benefit for a family of three in 2014
was nearly $500 per month, food stamp benefits received decline in income by nearly
30 cents on the dollar, so that benefits equal zero at the eligibility threshold. The top
panel of Figure 3.1 shows that food stamps receipt among the non-elderly population
hovered around 10% until the most recent recession, where it rose to nearly 13%.
In addition to the food stamps program, public schools provide low-income children
hot meals through free or reduce-price lunch subsidies. Children in families with
income less than 130% of the poverty line receive free lunches, and children in families
with income less than 185% of the poverty line receive reduced-price lunches. Over
the 1990-2013 period, about 37 percent of children participated in these subsidized
lunch programs.
Created in 1965, Medicaid originally provided health insurance to those eligible
for cash welfare programs, but in the 1980s and again in 1997, the program expanded
coverage to low-income children and pregnant women. Of the six benefit programs
considered in this paper, Medicaid contains perhaps the most significant within-
program variation in eligiblity rules, both across time and across states. Since the
mid-to-late 1990s, states have exercised substantial discretion in setting separate
eligbility standards for pregnant women, adults, and children of certain age groups.
Family income eligiblity requirements in 2014 to cover children, for example, now
range from more than 300% of poverty to as low as 133% of poverty. Alabama, for
instance, is one of the least generous states. In 2014, Alabama children are ineligible
if their annual family income exceeded 141% of the federal poverty guidelines: for a
family of three, this is about $27,900. Adults without children are never eligible, and
parents are ineligible in Alabama when annual family income exceeds 13% of poverty,
or about $2,570 for a family of three. By contrast, in one of the most expansive states,
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Minnesota, children are eligible up to at least 275% of poverty, and all adults are
eligible up to 200% of poverty.6
The Earned Income Tax Credit is a refundable tax credit for low-income tax filers,
where the value of the credit is based on earnings and whether the filer is married and
has children. The credit is zero for those with no earnings, and for higher earnings
levels it increases, plateaus, and phases out. The maximum credit in 2014 for a
couple with one child is about $3,300. For a given wage income, the credit increases
substantially in the number of children: with no children, the maximum credit is less
than $500.7
Housing subsidies through rental assistance, vouchers, and public housing units
support over 10 percent of all renters in the US. Most of these programs restrict
eligibility to those earning below 50 percent or 80 percent of the local area median
income. Compared to all other programs in this study, most housing subsidies also
differ in that they are not entitlements. Eligibility for public housing does not guarantee
benefit receipt, unlike it does (in principle) for food stamps or Medicaid, say. Finally,
the federal low-income heating assistance program provides credits for heating bills
during winter months. Administered by state and local agencies, eligibility is limited
to those below 110-to-150 percent of the poverty threshold and benefits fall in income
and depend on household size, fuel types, and the area in which a resident lives.
3.3 Methods
Using individual-level data from the 1990-2013 March CPS surveys I estimate the
linear probability model
6http://www.medicaid.gov/AffordableCareAct/Medicaid-Moving-Forward-2014/
Downloads/Medicaid-and-CHIP-Eligibility-Levels-Table.pdf
7http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Preview-of-2012-EITC-Income-Limits,
-Maximum-Credit--Amounts-and-Tax-Law-Updates
113
Yit = βwmst + ΛXit + ρs + µgt + it
where Y is the binary outcome of benefit program receipt. I estimate this equation
separately for six outcomes: food stamps, school lunch subsidies, Medicaid, EITC,
housing subsidies, or heating assistance. The key treatment variable is log of the
annual mean of the state-level minimum wage wm, so β is the semi-elasticity of the
outcome Y with respect to the minimum. For all the results in this paper, I limit
my sample to the nonelderly population, from ages 0-64, as adults in that population
are more likely to work and be affected by the minimum than older individuals at
retirement age. All regressions are weighted using the March CPS sample weights.
To increase statistical precision, I use a vector X of individual-level and state-level
controls. The former consist of dummies for race, family size, and education; indicators
for gender, Hispanic status, and marital status; and a quartic polynomial in age. I
also include annual controls for per-capita state GDP from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, the overall unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and
the state’s maximum supplement to the federal EITC, compiled by the University
of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research. The EITC policy variable is intended
capture the state’s generosity toward participation in government benefit programs.
All of these controls are plausibly unaffected by the minimum wage: for example,
most studies in the recent minimum wage literature, like Neumark et al. (2013) and
Allegretto et al. (2011) assume that any effects on the relatively small size of minimum
wage workforce is too small to affect the overall unemployment rate.
In addition to these controls, I include state fixed effects ρs and controls for spatial
heterogeneity µgt. The conventional two-way fixed effects model sets µgt equal to
common time effects τt, so that the resulting model
Yit = βwmit + ΛXit + ρi + τt + it
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represents a generalization of the difference-in-difference model, but with a continuous
treatment wm. Studies such as Allegretto et al. (2011) and Allegretto et al. (2013a)
show that the conventional approach fails to account for regional shocks correlated
with minimum wage changes. Using a model of distributed leads of the minimum
wage, Allegretto et al. (2011) illustrates that the conventional two-way fixed effects
model detects pre-trends and falling employment in years prior to minimum wage
increases. These spurious results indicate that states with high and low minimum
wages are likely to have different counterfactual employment paths. Allegretto et al.
(2013a) show that state-level minimum wage changes are not uniformly distributed
throughout the business cycle, and also that minimum wage-raising states are more
likely to have sharper downturns.
I follow Allegretto et al. (2011), and more recentlyDube (2013), in considering a
set of models that attempt to account for spatial heterogeneity in minimum wages. In
addition to the conventional fixed effects model with common time effects µgt = τt, I
consider models with Census region-specific time effects µgt = τrt and Census division-
specific µgt = τdt time effects. There are four Census regions — the Northeast, South,
Midwest, and West — and at a somewhat finer level of aggregation, nine Census
divisions. Because minimum wage increases are strongly correlated with the peak of
business cycle, I also supplement these models with state-recession specific controls, a
control variable introduced in Dube (2013):
Yit = βwmst + ΛXit + ρs + µgt + δsr(t) + it.
Here, δsr(t) is the vector of dummies for each state interacted with dummies for each
recessionary year, where I define the start and end of recessions as the first and last year
of each recession according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.8 This set of
fixed effects is similar but more flexible than some of the busines cycle heterogeneity
8http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html.
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controls explored in Page et al. (2005), where the authors interact state fixed effects
with continuous time-varying indicators like state GDP and unemployment rates.
Finally, I also consider models where I add state-specific linear trends to allow
states to have different counterfactual (linear) trends in program receipt. My most
saturated specification is therefore
Yit = βwmst + ΛXit + ρs + µgt + δsr(t) + σst+ it.
To choose among competing specifications, I employ a leaded effects falsification
test, adding a one-year leading minimum wage term to each of the above specifications.
Large coefficients on this term indicate implausible effects of the minimum one-year
prior to the actual increase. In general I find that on this falsification test, models with
region-specific τrt time effects outperform those with common τt or division-specific
τdt time effects.
3.4 Results
Table 3.1 shows, by benefit program receipt, the share of individuals living in
households with wage earners and minimum-wage earners, where the latter is defined
as an individual earning within 10 percent of the statutory minimum wage. The Table
shows that while wage earners are generally more prevalent in households not receiving
benefit programs9, most individuals live with wage earners even if their household is
program support eligible. Moreover, households receiving benefits such as food stamps,
lunch subsidies, Medicaid, EITC, and heating assistance, are more likely to have a
minimum wage earner than households who do not participate in these programs. The
higher prevalence of minimum wage earners in benefit receiving households suggests
that benefit program receipt may actually be affected by a change in the minimum
wage.
9One exception is EITC, for which earned income is a requirement.
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Table 3.2 reports elasticities of program receipt for all six programs with respect
to the minimum wage, across seven candidate models. To convert the minimum
wage coefficient β into an elasticity, I divide β by the mean program receipt in the
sample. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level (the policy
unit). Starting with the food stamps program, across all models I find strong evidence
that the minimum wage reduces participation in the food stamps program. The
conventional fixed effects model, in column 1, yields the lowest elasticity of -0.217,
statistically significant at the 10 percent level, and column 7 yields the strongest effect
at -0.567, significant at the 1 percent level.
Recalling that most food stamps benefit program eligibility cuts off at approximately
130% of poverty, we can compare these effects to estimates Dube (2013) reports for
the minimum wage elasticity of the 125% income-to-needs threshold. Placing my
results next to those in Dube (2013) are not apples-to-apples comparisons because
both income and thresholds are counted differently. Income counted or deducted
in determining eligibility is not necessarily the same as family income as defined by
the Current Population Survey. Also, poverty threshold levels used to determine
program eligibility differ from those used to determine official poverty status vary by
factors such as the number of children and elderly family members. The “poverty
family unit” used in Dube (2013) moreover does not necessarily correspond to the
family or household unit used for program elibility purposes. Nevertheless, Dube
(2013)’s preferred estimate at that threshold is -0.158, much smaller than the effects
I find, suggesting that some of the food stamps elasticities in Table 3.2 may be
implausibly large. One rationalization of this discrepancy in food stamps participation
and poverty-based elasticities may be that because the food stamps benefit declines
as income increases, households stop participating in food stamps at income-to-needs
thresholds substantially less than 130 percent of the poverty line. In particular, Dube
(2013)’s preferred poverty elasticity for 75% of poverty is -0.340.
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Turning to the free and reduced-price school lunch program, I find small, statistically
insignificant negative point estimates in all but the two specifications with state-specific
linear trends, where elasticities of -0.112 and -0.151 are statistically significant at
the five percent level. These elasticities seem relatively consistent with the relevant
elasticities reported in Dube (2013). Children are eligible for free lunches when income
is less than 135% of poverty and eligible for reduced-price lunches when income is less
than 185% of poverty. For 125% and 175% of poverty, Dube (2013) reports elasticities
of -0.158 and -0.066, respectively.
Elasticities to Medicaid follow a similar pattern, with the largest magnitudes
occuring in specifications with state-specific linear trends. For the region-specific time
effects model with linear trends, in column 4, a ten percent increase in the minimum
implies a 1.6 percent reduction in Medicaid participation. The effect is somewhat
stronger in column 7, with division-specific time effects and state-specific linear trends.
All remaining specifications obtain elasticities less than 0.1 in magnitude.
In contrast to other programs, I mostly find evidence that the minimum wage
increases EITC receipt. All point estimates are positive and five of seven are statistically
significant at the one or five percent levels. Increases in EITC receipt are hard to
rationalize with the fact that EITC “receipt” in the March CPS data is modeled
participation: the Census combines tax rules with survey responses to demographic
and pre-tax income information. As a result, the EITC indicator roughly represents
EITC eligibility, an upper bound on actual EITC participation. Any perceived increase
in EITC receipt must therefore arise from a reduction in income at higher family
income levels, or a increase in income for those who otherwise have no earnings. In
2014, a two-parent family with one child must earn less than about 38 thousand
dollars in order to qualify for the EITC, about twice the poverty line for that family.10
10For the 2014 EITC, see http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/
Preview-of-2012-EITC-Income-Limits,-Maximum-Credit--Amounts-and-Tax-Law-Updates.
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Because Dube (2013) finds no evidence of increased poverty at these thresholds in his
most credible set of models, large effects raising EITC receipt through this channel
seem unlikely.
Across all specifications, housing assistance receipt falls with the minimum wage
but the spread of point estimates is quite large. Housing assistance elasticities range
from -0.230 to -0.971, with the most negative elasticities and most precise elasticities
occuring in models with division-specific time effects. Heating assistance effects are
much less consistent and more imprecise across most specifications. Ranging from
-0.235 to 0.366, the only statistically significant elasticity is for the conventional
two-way fixed effects model, which suggests a large positive.
The leaded effects falsification test generates two sets of results. First, all models
fail the test for housing subsidy and heating assistance benefit programs. For these
programs, one-year lead elasticities are almost always greater than 0.1 in magnitude.
As a result, I do not consider any of the previous estimates for these programs to be
credible, and I refrain from reporting elasticities of these programs’ receipt in future
tables.
Second, models 2 through 4 generally have the smallest leading coefficients across
the four remaining benefit programs: food stamps, lunch subsidies, Medicaid, and
EITC. Specifications 5 through 7, using division-specific effects, show large leading
negative effects for both food stamps and the Medicaid program. The conventional
two-way fixed effects specification 1 also fails the leading effects test. Indeed, for
every benefit program, the conventional fixed effects model reports the most positive
elasticity estimates. I choose specification 4 as my preferred model — the specification
with region-specific time effects, state-specific recession effects and state-specific linear
time trends — for two reasons. It is both the most saturated model within this group
and, also, all of its leaded effects elasticities are less than 0.05 in magnitude for the
four non-housing and non-heating programs.
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Because the preference among region-specific-based models is not entirely unam-
biguous, I also show in Figure 3.2 the range of estimates for these three models.
Plotting 95% confidence intervals and point estimates, the Figure shows clear negative
effects of the minimum on food stampts receipt and some indications of zero-to-negative
effects on lunch subsidies and Medicaid receipt. For EITC, the most saturated model,
with an contemporaneous elasticity of 0.031, is the only model in Figure 3.2 has a
leaded effect under 0.05 in magnitude.
The food stamp receipt elasticity point estimates in these three specifications range
from -0.29 to -0.39 and are somewhat smaller than the implied elasticity of -0.46 in
West and Reich (2014)’s preferred specification using division-specific time effects with
state-specific trends. At the same time, the leaded effect elasticity implied by their
preferred specification is above 0.10 in magnitude.11 I also find larger contemporaneous
elasticities of food stamps receipt for models with division-specific time effects that do
not pass the leaded effects falsification test.
To gauge the magnitude of the minimum wage impact on the total cost of the food
stamps program, I estimate my preferred specification
Yit = βwmst + ΛXit + ρs + µrt + δsr(t) + σst+ it
but where the outcome Y is the real value of annual food stamps income for the
household in 2012$, deflated using the CPI-U-RS. Using region-specific time effects,
state-specific linear trends, and state-specific recession fixed effects, the estimate of β
is -$183.06 in 2012$. Given that the unconditional mean food stamps receipt in my
sample is $331, I calculate that the food stamp income elasticity with respect to the
minimum is -0.553 (standard error 0.138).
11In Appendix A, West and Reich (2014) write that in their preferred family-level linear probability
model, the one-year leading minimum wage coefficient is 0.011. Because their estimate on p.10 of
the share of families in poverty is 9.1 percent, the implied one-year leading effect elasticity is about
0.12. The authors note that for their state-level enrollment regression, the one-year lead elasticity is
smaller, at 0.07, but for their state-level expenditures regression the one-year lead elasticity 0.16.
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Now consider a 25 percent minimum wage increase. With the food stamp in-
come elasticity of -0.553, a 25 minimum wage increase reduces total food stamps
expenditures by 0.25 * 0.553 = 13.8 percent. In my 2012 sample, the unconditional
mean household benefit receipt is about $543 and there are approximately 101 million
households. Hence, the reduction in food stamps spending is $7.6 billion, as food
stamps expenditures fall from $55 billion to $47 billion. The strong food stamp
income elasticity estimate is nearly three times as large as the state-level expenditures
elasticity of -0.190 estimated by West and Reich (2014) and may be too large to be
realistic. In the following exercise, I assess the size of my estimated food stamps
income elasticity by comparing its implications for food stamp benefit reduction with
those expected by the size of the minimum wage increase.
The 25 percent minimum wage increase will reduce the 2012 unconditional mean
benefit from $543 to $468, using the estimated food stamps income elasticity of -0.553.
Given my preferred food stamps receipt elasticity of -0.393, the minimum wage increase
will reduce the 2012 participation rate from 0.142 to 0.128. Thus, the mean benefit
receipt for food stamp recipients (conditional on receipt) will fall from $543 / 0.142 =
$3,823 to $468 / 0.128 = $3,656, a decline of roughly 4.4 percent, or $167. To see how
this value compares to what is expected of a 25 percent minimum wage increase, first
observe that my sample’s 2012 mean minimum wage is about $7.55. A 25 percent
minimum wage increase to about $9.44 therefore represents nearly $1,888 to $3,775
additional annual income for a minimum wage employee working one-to-two thousand
hours per year. If food stamp benefits decline by about 30 cents on the dollar, the
income increase would reduce the food stamp benefits of a household with a minimum
wage worker by $566 to $1,133 per year. In my 2012 sample of households receiving
food stamps, about 12.1 percent contain a minimum wage worker (compared to 6.6
percent of households not receiving food stamps). Therefore we would expect a decline
in food stamp income of $566 * 0.121 = $68 to $1,113 * 0.121 = $137, compared to the
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larger estimate of $167. In future work I intend to assess alternative specifications for
food stamps income elasticities, using both alternative control sets and also nonlinear
models like Poisson regression.
In Table 3.4 I show the results of my preferred specification for several subgroups:
single mothers, children, black individuals, and the period after the year 2000. Except
for the EITC, all of the elasticities in Table 3.4 are negative, and most are statistically
significant at least at the ten percent level. For all of the subgroups I find precise
and much larger impacts on food stamp receipt; for children, the elasticity is 0.694
and highly statistically significant. Lunch subsidies for the single mother and children
subgroups are likely similar to the overall sample because only households with children
are eligible for the lunch subsidy program. Elasticities of Medicaid with respect to
the minimum seem to be stronger for single mothers and children, for whom these
programs tend to target their services. For the period after 2000, which is post-welfare
reform in the United States, I find more negative elasticities than in the overall period,
in contrast to the poverty-related findings in Dube (2013) In the later 2000-2012
period, EITC eligibility falls after a minimum wage increase, but the elasticity of -0.09
is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
3.5 Discussion
Across the set of specifications that pass the leaded effects falsficiation test and
for selected subgroups with my preferred specification, I find some evidence that
minimum wages reduce benefit program receipt, particularly for food stamps and also
for Medicaid and school lunch subsidies, depending on the specification. On the face,
these results are consistent with the idea that minimum wages raise household income.
I find food stamp elasticities somewhat larger than what is suggested by the most
recent estimates in Dube (2013) on the minimum wage’s effect on poverty reduction.
Because the food stamps benefit declines in income, existing participants have less
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incentive to remain in the program if their incomes rise. As a result, it may be that
decreases in participation occur well below the food stamps income cutoffs, where
minimum wage effects on family income appear to be greater.
The substitution of public benefit participation with increased pre-tax earnings has
no straightforward implication for worker welfare, especially given that an individual
welfare calculation will depend on the magnitudes of offsetting effects: for example,
despite a minimum wage increase some workers may be left with the same post-tax
and transfer income. From a public policy point of view, however, another important
consideration is that increasing pre-tax earnings may be more fiscally efficient than
expanding tax and transfer policy to affect post-tax income. Much of the existing
evidence on tax and transfer policies indicates that redistributions from the rich to
poor incur large costs due to behavioral responses such as tax avoidance strategies
and labor supply effects. For example, from a midpoint of the most credible estimates,
Saez et al. (2012) calculate that for a tax increase focused on the top one percent of
earners, the marginal excess burden of an extra dollar of federal tax revenue is almost
34 cents. Hendren (2013) calculates that that one-third of the net resource cost of
the food stamps program is due to its negative effects on labor supply. Although
there is considerable uncertainty in these cost estimates, the fact that they are sizable
indicates the need to use policy levers that affect the pre-tax income distribution.
Future work on the effects of the minimum wage could use higher quality data
to provide more direct estimates of the minimum wage’s impact on EITC transfers.
Because of the credit’s phase-in and phase-out periods, the effect of the minimum on
actual EITC payments is ambiguous, even if the minimum wage has no deleterious
effects on income through increased disemployment. As the EITC and minimum
wage are viewed as complementary tools both in theory (Lee and Saez, 2012) and in
policy discussions, better understanding any minimum wage-EITC interactions may
be particularly helpful.
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Table 3.1. Shares of individuals living in wage or minimum-wage earnings households,
by benefit program receipt
Receives benefit Does not receive benefit
HH wage earner HH min wage earner HH wage earner HH min wage earner
Food Stamps 0.700 0.134 0.927 0.083
Lunch subsidy 0.828 0.142 0.967 0.089
Medicaid 0.724 0.117 0.931 0.084
EITC 0.960 0.172 0.889 0.065
Housing subsidy 0.650 0.109 0.897 0.109
Heating asst. 0.662 0.122 0.912 0.087
Note: Statistics for the nonelderly population aged 0 - 64. Minimum wage earner is an individual
earning within 10 percent of the statutory minimum wage.
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Figure 3.1. Benefit program receipt, poverty, and unemployment rates, 1990-2013
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The figure shows annual household benefit program receipt, poverty, and unemployment
rates. Benefit program receipt and poverty rates calculated are for the non-elderly
population in the March Current Population Survey data. Bureau of Labor Statistics
unemployment rates are for the overall population.
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Figure 3.2. Preferred benefit program elasticities with respect to the minimum wage:
point estimates and 95% confidence intervals, by specification
Region X Year
Region X Year
State X Recess
Region X Year
State X Recess
Trends
−.6 −.3 0 .3
Food Stamps
−.6 −.3 0 .3
Lunch subsidy
−.6 −.3 0 .3
Medicaid
Region X Year
Region X Year
State X Recess
Region X Year
State X Recess
Trends
−.6 −.3 0 .3
EITC
The figure shows food stamps, lunch subsidy, medicaid, and EITC receipt elasticities
and 95% confidence intervals for the preferred set of specifications using region X year
time effects: specifications 2, 3, and 4 in Table 2.
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